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While decades of research have substantiated a link between the descriptive 
representation of women in elective office and the substantive representation of women’s 
policy interests, an overwhelming majority of these studies focus on gender effects during 
the traditional policymaking process. I seek to extend this research to the broader context of 
America’s system of checks and balances. To do so, I focus on one of the most prominent 
examples of interbranch relations—the confirmation of justices to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The empirical chapters in this work examine potential gender differences at several 
steps in the confirmation process. An analysis of forty Supreme Court confirmations reveals 
that female senators weigh the ideology of a nominee more heavily than their male 
counterparts when casting a final confirmation vote. Importantly, these differences held after 
controlling for the fact that noticeable numbers of women have entered the Senate only in 
recent decades, which have been shown to be a particularly ideological time in confirmation 
politics. Further investigations reveal that Democratic female senators are the primary 
driving force behind these noted gender differences. 
Additional examinations show that female senators are also more vocal advocates for 
women’s issues during confirmation proceedings. Analyses of floor statements from five 
confirmations reveal that female senators devoted proportionally more of their floor time to 
statements defending and advocating for the protection of women’s rights. These differences 
are particularly pronounced when senators are faced with a Republican nominee to the 
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Court. Qualitative analyses suggest that these gender differences are also present during 
confirmation hearings.  
This dissertation therefore extends the existing literature connecting the levels of 
women’s descriptive and substantive representation to an interbranch context. Such findings 
highlight how the growing gender diversity in Congress not only affects the legislative 
branch, but rather reverberates through the entire federal government.   
 





On October 8, 1991, seven female Democratic members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives descended upon the Senate. The congresswomen’s intent was to interrupt 
the regularly scheduled meeting of the Democratic caucus in hopes of convincing their 
Senate colleagues to delay the impending confirmation vote on Supreme Court nominee 
Clarence Thomas. The congresswomen were reacting to what they perceived as the Senate’s 
unjust dismissal of the accusations of sexual harassment put forth by law professor Anita 
Hill. The Senate Judiciary Committee, which had no female members, appeared to be ready 
to vote on the nomination without formally considering the matter, but the seven 
congresswomen were committed to delaying the process until Professor Hill’s claims were 
thoroughly investigated. According to Representative Louise Slaughter (D-NY), what the 
Senate needed to hear, and what the congresswomen were there to deliver, was “the 
woman’s point of view” on this matter (Dowd 1991).      
Clarence Thomas’s nomination to the Supreme Court would result in one of the 
most intense confirmation battles in U.S. history. In spite of the congresswomen’s success in 
ultimately delaying the confirmation vote, the Democratically controlled Senate would go on 
to approve the nomination by the narrow margin of 57-46. However, the significance of the 
Thomas confirmation did not stop there. This controversial nomination, along with the 
accompanying allegations of sexual harassment, would also prove to be a watershed for 
2 
women in American politics. As the country watched this saga unfold before an all-male 
Senate Judiciary Committee and an almost entirely all-male Senate, the paucity of female 
officeholders was suddenly brought to the nation’s attention.1 Such concerns helped turn the 
electoral tides in favor of female candidates, and in the following 1992 election, a record-
breaking number of women took seats in both the House and the Senate, earning it the title 
of “Year of the Woman”. 
The number of female senators has continued to rise in recent years, but little 
systematic research has explored what effects, if any, this increased heterogeneity has had on 
the inner-workings of the Senate. Nowhere is this oversight more conspicuous than in the 
arena of confirmation politics. Scholars have cited Thomas’s nomination as a catalyst for the 
historic 1992 election (Kim 1998; Paolino 1995), yet few studies have asked if the 
subsequent increase in female senators has impacted the confirmation process. This project 
will explore this question by exploring potential gender differences in various aspects of 
confirmation proceedings for nominees to the United States Supreme Court. 
 
Interbranch Bargaining and the Political Representation of Women’s Interests 
At the broadest level, this project is located within the line of research that explores 
gender differences in legislative behavior. Scholars of gender politics have long been 
concerned with the potential connection between descriptive and substantive representation, 
or the extent to which women in public office will work on behalf of women’s group 
interests. A simple question lies at the heart of these analyses: do women in public office 
                                                 
1 In many respects, this newfound unease over the existing gender imbalance in Congress outlived the Thomas 
nomination itself. In a poll taken a year after Thomas’s confirmation, 14 percent of respondents reported that 
“the single most important lesson learned from the Hill/Thomas controversy” was that “more women should 
be elected to the Senate” (Borger, Guest, and Thorton 1992). 
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make a difference? Decades of research have explored this question by examining potential 
gender effects from a variety of angles, ranging from differences in legislative priorities and 
roll-call voting (Vega and Firestone 1995; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002) to differences in 
leadership styles and constituent responsiveness (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 2005; Epstein, 
Niemi, and Powell 2005). The majority of findings in this area suggest that female 
officeholders are substantively different from their male counterparts, especially when it 
comes to issues that disproportionately affect women’s lives. On these matters, female 
legislators are often stronger advocates, spokespersons, and leaders.   
While these studies have amassed a wealth of information regarding the effects of 
women in public office, the existing literature has overlooked several essential activities that 
legislators engage in. At the federal level, one potentially important area that has been 
ignored is interbranch relations. Decades of research have explored gender differences 
within Congress, but little scholarship has analyzed the effects of gender diversity within the 
larger political environment. American national political institutions, and the representatives 
in them, do not operate in isolation. Rather, they are embedded within a complex web of 
Madisonian checks and balances in which no one branch of government is entirely 
independent from the others. A growing line of literature has looked at this political and 
governmental overlap by studying multiple institutions concurrently. However, this 
interbranch framework has unfortunately been absent in the gender and politics literature. 
To date, we know very little about if and when congresswomen use their power to advocate 
for the representation of women’s interests in the other branches of government, an 
oversight that could systematically understate female officeholders’ true impact on national 
politics. This study will take a step toward filling that void by positing that female members 
of Congress will strategically maneuver within the American system of checks and balances 
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to represent women’s substantive group interests. Because of these efforts, it is expected that 
the level of women’s congressional representation will not only have an effect within the 
legislative branch, but, rather, will reverberate throughout the entire layer of the federal 
government.  
    
Gender and Supreme Court Confirmations 
This project will embrace an interbranch framework by focusing on one of the most 
prominent examples of checks and balances in American governmental institutions—the 
confirmation of justices to the U.S. Supreme Court. Supreme Court confirmations are high-
stakes events that lie at the intersection of all three branches of government. Because of their 
recognized importance and unique placement within the nation’s system of interbranch 
relations, Supreme Court confirmations are prominent affairs where a variety of political and 
institutional factors converge. 
Supreme Court politics are also especially relevant to women’s substantive group 
interests. In recent decades, the Court has handed down a variety of landmark decisions that 
directly affect the lives of American women—ruling on everything from the legal parameters 
of gender discrimination (Reed v. Reed (1971)), to equality in the workforce (Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes (2011); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974); County of Washington v. Gunther 
(1981)), to sexual harassment (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993)), and reproductive rights 
(Griswold v. Connecticut (1965); Roe v. Wade (1973)). While the fates of these issues may be 
decided outside of the halls of the Congress, they are not entirely outside of the purview of 
U.S. congresswomen. Members of Congress exercise a variety of powers over the Court, 
including the right of senators to offer advice and consent through the confirmation process. 
And since previous research has shown that female legislators make the biggest legislative 
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impact on issues that are relevant to women’s substantive group interests (see Thomas 1989; 
Swers 2002), it is reasonable to expect that such gender differences may be  replicated within 
the arena of confirmation politics.  
The proposed analysis will therefore deepen our understanding of congressional 
gender politics by asking if there is a connection between descriptive representation (i.e., the 
number of female officeholders) and substantive representation (i.e., the extent to which 
women’s issues are being addressed) within the context of Supreme Court confirmations. 
The following chapters will dissect this larger issue by asking a host of more tailored research 
questions, including: Do male and female senators evaluate nominees to the United States 
Supreme Court differently? Are female senators more likely than their male counterparts to 
advocate for the representation of women’s interests during confirmations to the U.S. 
Supreme Court?  And, does the presence of female senators during the confirmation process 
ultimately affect who gets confirmed? 
In addition, this project will also contribute to the broader literature on judicial and 
confirmation politics by highlighting how senators’ personal characteristics and opinions can 
influence their behavior in this arena. Previous studies have looked at the importance of a 
judicial nominee’s race and gender during confirmation proceedings (Nixon and Goss 2001; 
Martinek, Kemper, and Van Winkle 2002); however, little is known about if and how the 
levels of descriptive representation among the members of Congress affect these processes. 
By importing insights from the traditional legislative behavior literature, this project will 





Gender Differences in Confirmation Proceedings  
This work will explore gender differences during confirmation proceedings for 
Supreme Court nominees from three separate angles: differences in confirmation voting, 
floor statements, and actions in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The project begins by first 
situating the research within the larger literature on gender and political representation. 
Chapter Two reviews the work in this field, identifies lacunas, and then uses insights from 
the existing literature to develop new theories on the effects of gender diversity in a political 
landscape predicated upon a system of checks and balances. 
Chapter Three explores gender differences in confirmation votes for Supreme Court 
nominations. Confirmation voting is probably the most studied aspect of nomination 
politics, but the current literature has been criticized for not adequately accounting for the 
competing goals and individual preferences of senators (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990: 
532). This chapter addresses such concerns by introducing gender as a politically relevant 
social identity factor that can influence how senators evaluate potential Supreme Court 
justices. The proposed analysis therefore asks if descriptive representation matters in this 
context by seeing if female senators cast systematically different confirmation votes than 
their male counterparts.   
Previous research has found that senators’ confirmation votes are influenced by a 
variety of political and institutional factors—including partisan considerations, the 
professional qualifications of the nominee, and the ideological distance between the nominee 
and senator. Using these insights as a starting point, Chapter Three begins by contending 
that, of these factors, ideology is the most relevant to women’s substantive group interests. 
If female senators are thinking about the future of women’s rights in America, then they 
should be particularly vigilant over the ideological composition of the Court. Therefore, I 
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argue that gender differences during this stage of the confirmation process should be 
manifested through senators’ ideological considerations.  
The empirical analysis in this chapter explores confirmation votes from forty 
Supreme Court nominations. The results provide support for the proposed hypothesis by 
showing that female senators weigh a nominee’s ideology more heavily than male senators. 
In other words, female senators are less likely to support nominees who do not share their 
ideological viewpoints than are male senators. Additional analyses reveal that this is 
predominately (if not entirely) a Democratic phenomenon—while female Democrats place 
strong emphasis on a nominee’s ideology, Republican women do not appear to share this 
priority.   
The findings in Chapter Three uncover broad-based ideological gender differences; 
however, the proposed theory makes more precise predictions about the types of ideological 
concerns that should separate male and female senators. Specifically, it is hypothesized that 
female senators’ commitment to women’s issues is driving the observed gender differences 
in voting patterns. Such a hypothesis cannot be tested by looking at roll-call data alone. To 
explore this question, we need to know more about why senators voted the way they did. 
Chapter Four of the project therefore pursues a different strategy by analyzing senators’ 
floor statements. The goal of this inquiry is to see if female senators are more likely than 
male senators to use their floor statements to advocate for women’s issues.   
The empirics in this chapter are comprised of content analyses for a handful of 
theoretically interesting cases from recent years. These Supreme Court confirmations—those 
of Sonia Sotomayor, John Roberts, Stephen Breyer, David Souter, and Sandra Day 
O’Connor—were chosen because they offer variation on a range of important political and 
institutional factors. The results show that male and female senators address women’s issues 
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at similar rates during their floor statements. However, a second level of analysis reveals that 
they articulate significantly different viewpoints on these matters. Specifically, female 
senators devote proportionally more of their floor time to championing women’s issues and 
advocating for continued or expanded legal protections in these areas. The results also 
suggest that these gender differences are particularly strong when senators are vetting a 
Republican nominee to the Court.       
 Chapter Five, the last empirical chapter of this project, looks inside the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. This Committee has played a vital role in recent Supreme Court 
nominations. Every nominee since John Harlan in 1955 has provided a public testimony 
before the Committee, and these testimonies have become highly watched political events. 
Despite the political and procedural importance of confirmation hearings, very few studies 
have systematically explored what actually happens in them. In order to better understand 
this step of the process, Chapter Five takes a detailed look at one confirmation hearing—
that of Chief Justice John Roberts. By focusing on one nomination, I am able to directly 
compare deliberations during different steps of the confirmation process. The analyses 
reveal that women’s issues received proportionally more attention in committee than they 
did during floor consideration of the nominee. While the small number of women on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee poses significant challenges to analyzing gender differences 
during this stage, the evidence provides preliminary support for the assertion that women’s 
presence on the Senate Judiciary Committee (or relative lack thereof) does affect the 
handling of women’s issues during confirmation hearings. During the Roberts confirmation, 
the discussion about women’s issues was significantly more negative in tone during 
committee deliberations (when only one woman was present) than it was during floor 
deliberations (when proportionally more women were present). In addition, the one woman 
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on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), was the strongest 
advocate for women’s issues during the confirmation hearing and clearly saw herself as the 
representative for a national constituency of women.  
 
Conclusion 
This project unites two disparate areas of literature—studies analyzing women’s 
representation in legislative institutions (particularly congressional gender politics) and 
studies analyzing confirmation proceedings for nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court. By 
uniting these areas of study, I hope to expand our understanding of the possible impacts of 
congressional gender diversity and explore potential connections between descriptive and 
substantive representation that have largely been overlooked in the existing research. Finally, 
by analyzing the confirmation process through a gendered lens, this study may provide a 
deeper understanding of individual senator’s motivations and actions, which could shed new 
light on the various political and institutional factors at play during confirmation 




Descriptive Representation and Interbranch Politics 
 
When Representative Louise Slaughter declared that she and the other 
congresswomen went to the Senate to educate its members about the “women’s point of 
view,” she claimed to be working for a constituency that was far larger than her electoral 
district. This type of representation—when a female officeholder purports to represent a 
larger community of women—is at the heart of this analysis. Legislative and feminist 
scholars have long been concerned with understanding the extent to which the descriptive 
representation of women (i.e., the physical presence of women in relevant governing bodies) 
will lead to the substantive representation of women’s group interests. Specifically, 
proponents of legislative diversity often contend that the inclusion of female officeholders 
will make governing bodies better equipped to address women’s issues, usually defined as 
issues relating to reproductive health, childcare, education, and other social welfare issues. In 
this sense, female representatives are expected to have a transformative impact on political 
institutions.  
Over the past several decades, as more women have made their way into elected 
offices, scholars have been given the opportunity to empirically study these supposed links. 
Research in this area has made significant progress in delineating the impact of women’s 
political representation; however, the findings are often contradictory and the list of studied 
activities is far from complete. This chapter will begin by reviewing the broader theory on 
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gender and substantive representation, including theoretical challenges that have been 
mounted against this line of work. I will then review the empirical research in this area, 
paying particular attention to studies that examine the legislative and policy impacts of 
female officeholders. The chapter will conclude by laying the groundwork for extending this 
literature to an interbranch setting and, specifically, to confirmation proceedings for 
Supreme Court nominees.    
 
Why Should We Expect a Woman to Represent Women?  
As members of a historically marginalized community, female officeholders often 
have heightened representational demands. In addition to representing their geographic 
constituency, their political supporters, and their party’s interests, female politicians are also 
frequently seen as representatives of a larger constituency of women. On one hand, this 
representational role is inherent and automatic, based solely on the social identity of the 
elected official. This type of representation, which simply looks at the physical similarities 
between an elected assembly and society at large, is what Hanna Pitkin referred to as 
descriptive representation in her 1967 seminal work. Substantive representation, by contrast, 
refers to a legislator’s ability to represent the views and interests of his or her constituents, 
such as when a legislator votes or speaks on behalf of the people.  
In terms of gender politics, female officeholders automatically ensure the descriptive 
representation of women, and, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, there has been an undeniable 
increase in this type of representation at all levels of public office. From 1981 to 2011, 
women’s representation in state legislatures rose from 12.1% to 23.7%, and the percent of 
statewide elective executive offices held by female politicians more than doubled, rising from 
10.5% to 22.4%. Women’s representation at the federal level has historically lagged behind 
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that of the states. Since 1789, women have only accounted for 2% of Congress’s 
membership. However, these numbers have also been increasing in recent decades, and 
reached an all time high of 18.3% in the current 113th Congress. (Center for American 
Women in Politics).   
 
Figure 2.1: Percent of Women in Congress and State Legislatures, 1917-2013 
Note: Data for this graph was collected from the Center for American Women in Politics 
(http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu). 
   
 
For many feminist scholars, these numerical increases alone are a cause for 
celebration. This rapid growth in the number of female officeholders shows that electoral 
institutions are becoming more permeable and diverse. Through these changes, electoral 
bodies are visibly morphing into more accurate mirrors of the larger electorate. Apart from 
the potential effects on substantive representation, this increased heterogeneity may offer its 
own benefits, especially in a context of historical marginalization or (in the case of women) 
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complete political exclusion. At the individual level, minority representatives may serve an 
important role-model function for other members of their group. In addition, these effects 
do not necessarily stop at the personal level, but, rather, can spill over to the collective 
consciousness of a society (Mansbridge 1999). For example, the inclusion of traditionally 
marginalized members in a nation’s relevant governing bodies can challenge long-standing 
notions of second-class citizenship and thereby rewrite the connotations that are attached to 
group memberships. Descriptively representative assemblies can also foster a feeling of 
political inclusion, which may in turn bolster an institution’s democratic legitimacy 
(Mansbrige 1999; Phillips 1991).         
While female officeholders, by definition, offer descriptive representation to a larger 
class of women, their presence may not be a sufficient or even a necessary ingredient for 
women’s substantive representation. Since substantive representation denotes action, a 
female officeholder has to do more than merely be present to represent women in this 
capacity—she has to actively work on behalf of women. A particular female officeholder 
may fail in this regard by neglecting (or cognizantly rejecting) women’s views on a particular 
subject, or simply by being an ineffective legislator. In addition, unlike descriptive 
representation, a legislator does not have to be a female in order to substantively represent 
women. A male legislator may be just as effective, or even more effective, than his female 
colleagues at listening to and working on behalf of women’s interests.  
Descriptive and substantive representation are therefore separate and discrete 
concepts. However, a large line of research within the gender and politics literature, and the 
one that this work is primarily concerned with, posits a connection between these two forms 
of representation. It is often theorized that members of marginalized communities, such as 
women and racial minorities, have distinct shared life experiences that enable them to better 
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represent their group’s interests than nonmembers. For women, these differences are usually 
thought to be the result of biological or sociological distinctions. For example, because 
women exclusively experience pregnancy and childbirth and have historically been the 
primary caregivers for children, it is often assumed that female voters and officeholders will 
have a heightened interest in issues relating to reproductive health and childcare.  
Many scholars of gender politics believe that these affective differences will translate 
into differences in legislative priorities and outcomes when women hold elective office. This 
assumed connection between descriptive and substantive representation therefore 
complicates the traditional view of officeholders as single-minded seekers of reelection 
(Mayhew 1974) by contending that some elected representatives will work on behalf of a 
population that extends beyond their electoral constituency. Such beliefs are often cited as 
another justification for descriptive representation. According to this reasoning, governing 
bodies need to be a microcosm of the larger population in order to ensure that all societal 
interests will be adequately represented.   
 
Theoretical Challenges to Descriptive Representation  
The concept of descriptive representation is certainly not without its critics. On one 
front, scholars have cast doubt on descriptive representation’s ability to bring about 
substantive policy change. Such criticisms highlight the fact that female politicians are still 
politicians, and therefore should respond to the same electoral pressures as their male 
counterparts. According to this logic, the belief that female officeholders will somehow 
transform political institutions is irrational and politically naive. Instead of acting as agents of 
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change, female representatives will simply adapt to their political environments and engage 
in politics as usual.2 
Critics have also challenged the idea that a non-traditional political actor can speak 
on behalf of an entire marginalized community. Here, scholars warn that proponents of 
gender-based representation come dangerously close to essentialism. This concept refers to 
the “assumption that members of certain groups have an essential identity that all members 
of that group share and of which no others can partake” (Mansbridge 1999: 637). The 
assertion that female officeholders will legislate, first and foremost, as women is particularly 
vulnerable to two theoretical challenges. First, such beliefs create an imagined homogeneous 
community of women with a unified set of interests. However, when one recognizes the true 
diversity that exists amongst women, it becomes harder to entrust a single individual with 
the duty of representing a coherent group perspective (Weldon 2002). Second, by arguing 
that male legislators cannot adequately represent women’s interests, there is the opposite 
logic that women cannot adequately represent men’s interests. Such reasoning could lead to 
the ghettoization of non-traditional political actors by relegating them to limited 
representational roles.  
In addition to those who argue that the concept of descriptive representation is 
detrimental to minorities, there are also scholars who are normatively opposed to the idea of 
segmental politics. Of importance here is the classic Burkean notion of representation, which 
contends that “representatives should not serve local interests but the nation” (Phillips 1991: 
64). According to Burke, the spirit of public service obliges elected officials to work on 
behalf of an objective national good. As Pitkin notes, “For Burke, political representation is 
                                                 
2 These different beliefs about female officeholders are what Thomas (1994) refers to as “reformist” versus 
“adaptive” expectations. 
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the representation of interest, and interest has an objective, impersonal, unattached reality” 
(1967: 168). According to this view, the identity of a particular representative is irrelevant, as 
all elected officials should recognize and work toward a unified and common public agenda. 
This homogeneity, in turn, guards against the potential balkanization of the political 
landscape.  
Skeptics of descriptive representation also question “which characteristics are 
politically relevant for reproduction” (Pitkin 1967: 87). Such criticisms warn that descriptive 
representation can be the first step down a slippery slope. After all, there are an infinite 
number of potential groups in any society, and even the strongest supporters of descriptive 
representation would acknowledge that not all collective identities deserve formal political 
representation. As one critic pithily stated, “no one would argue that morons should be 
represented by morons” (Pennock 1979: 314).  
The current work will proceed cautiously and take these theoretical challenges to 
heart. The potential connection between women’s descriptive and substantive representation 
will not be assumed to be automatic or guaranteed. Throughout the analysis, special care will 
be taken to theorize precisely how gender diversity might affect a particular stage of the 
confirmation process. The analysis will recognize and highlight how the existence or level of 
substantive representation is likely contingent upon various historical and institutional 
factors—such as electoral considerations, partisan arrangements, and women’s access to key 
institutional positions. The work will also be careful to pay attention to the differences 
amongst women, and the actions of male senators will also be examined.  
This project does, however, start with the assumption that gender is a socially and 
politically relevant descriptive trait. While individual women may differ in their opinions and 
views, women as a group share a certain level of common social and political history which 
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warrants their grouping as a political cohort. Scholars of representative democracy have 
identified guiding questions to help discriminate between cases where descriptive 
representation is and is not justified, including: is the targeted group under-represented in 
the legislative process compared to their proportions in the electorate? Do members of the 
group believe that they are able to represent their own interests? And, is there evidence that 
dominant groups have, in the past or present, actively discouraged or even legally prohibited 
the group from attaining formal political representation (Mansbridge 1999: 639)? For women 
within the American political setting, the answer to all of these questions is yes.         
 
What the Evidence Has to Say 
The debate around the value of diversity in representative assemblies has not been 
limited to an abstract exercise in democratic theory. Rather, scholars in this field have moved 
into the world of empirics and begun analyzing gender differences in a variety of political 
aspects, including everything from gender differences in partisanship, participation, and 
public opinion (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef, and Lin 2004; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; 
Huddy, Cassese, and Lizotte 2008; Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001) to the experiences of 
female candidates (Dolan 2008; Sanbonmatsu 2006) and gender differences in leadership 
styles (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 1998). However, the current project is most appropriately 
situated within the large line of research that explores the possible connections between 
descriptive and substantive representation.   
While critics of descriptive representation have reminded us of the dangers 
associated with equating an individual’s voice with that of a group perspective, the extant 
empirical research does suggest that there is at least a perceived connection in these regards 
within the context of gender politics. For example, studies have shown that female legislators 
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are more likely than their male counterparts to see women as a distinct part of their 
constituency and are more likely to see themselves as representatives of those interests 
(Reingold 1992; Dodson 2006; Thomas 1994). Studies have also found that female legislators 
believe that they are better qualified than male representatives to speak on behalf of 
women’s interests (Reingold 1992). These findings suggest that female legislators not only 
have a sense of obligation to a larger community of women; they also believe that they bring 
a unique female perspective to the political realm, which can alter existing political dialogues. 
Such sentiments were captured in a 1997 interview with Representative Nancy Johnson (R-
CT). When reflecting on her personal legislative goals and responsibilities, Representative 
Johnson remarked:  
 
We need to integrate the perspective of women into the policy-making process, just 
like we have now successfully integrated the perspective of environmental 
preservation, the perspective of worker safety…Whenever something comes up, we 
automatically think, ‘Gee, how will this affect the environment? How will this affect 
the working people at the work site?’ But we don’t really think ‘How is this going to 
affect women who work at home? Women in the workplace with home 
responsibilities? Women who are single parents?’ And so I do feel a special 
responsibility to participate in the public process in a way that assures that…I think 
through ‘How will this affect women who are at home taking care of children who 
need to re-enter the workforce later on? How does this affect women who didn’t get 
to go beyond high school because their family thought only boys should go to 
college, and now they’re stuck.’ I know a lot more [than congressmen] about the 
shape of women’s lives and the pattern of women’s lives, so I need to look and see: 
How will the public policy affect those patterns? And how will they help or hurt? 
(qtd. in Carroll 2002: 54) 
 
In addition to these beliefs and perceived responsibilities, surveys have also 
consistently uncovered significant ideological gender gaps among political elites. In a survey 
study of legislators in twelve states, Thomas found that women were more likely than men 
to identify with a liberal political ideology while men were more than twice as likely as 
women to prescribe to a conservative ideology (1994). It is important to note that these 
19 
differences were significant even after controlling for party affiliation, meaning that 
ideological gaps between female and male legislators exist over and above those that can be 
explained by party cleavages alone.  
Such affective differences have also been reflected in the legislative priorities of male 
and female legislators. In a 1991 study, Thomas and Welch found that women rate pieces of 
legislation pertaining to women, children, and families as a higher priority than male 
legislators. This same study also found that such priority differences were reflected in the 
distribution of committee seat shares, and that women were more likely than men to 
mention their work on policies pertaining to these issues when asked about their proudest 
legislative accomplishments. Male legislators, by contrast, were more likely to mention their 
work on bills pertaining to business and commerce. 
These studies seem to establish evidence in favor of the claim that female legislators 
have distinct policy priorities. Yet, the question remains if their presence actually affects final 
policy outcomes. Here, the evidence is more mixed. Studies have found that female 
officeholders do impact the legislative agenda by sponsoring and cosponsoring bills relating 
to women’s issues at a higher rate than male officeholders (Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 
2002; Bratton and Haynie 1999). However, this relationship does not appear to hold at the 
aggregate level, as institutions with higher percentages of female legislators do not necessarily 
produce more women-related legislation (Thomas 1994). Such findings suggest that 
individual-level differences do not necessarily translate into institutional-level changes. This 
representational puzzle is at the heart of the debate over critical mass theory, which will be 
explored later in this chapter.       
Studies examining the influence of gender on voting behavior are similarly 
inconclusive. In this area, scholars have found that female legislators tend to have slightly 
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more liberal voting records than their male counterparts; however, such differences are often 
small and not always statistically significant (Frankovic 1977; Welch 1985; Vega and 
Firestone 1995). More consistent gender differences have been uncovered in studies 
examining roll-call voting on specific women’s issue legislation, such as bills relating to 
abortion and women’s health; although, the strength of these findings often vary across time 
and political landscapes (Day 1994; Tatalovitch and Schier 1993; Swers 1998; Dolan 1998; 
Swers 2002). This complicated connection between gender and roll-call voting will take 
center stage in Chapter Three. 
 
An Interbrach Theory of Women in Congress 
The bulk of existing research exploring gender differences between male and female 
legislators has taken place at the state level; yet, recent work has replicated these findings 
within the halls of Congress. While such efforts have therefore extended gender analyses to 
the federal level, the literature still has virtually nothing to say about women’s influence on 
the broader array of national political institutions. Congressional responsibilities extend 
beyond the traditional policymaking process and include other important governmental 
activities, some of which allow members of Congress to interject themselves into the 
ongoing affairs of the executive and judicial branches. A growing line of research has 
adopted an interbranch framework by exploring various aspects of the American system of 
checks and balances—including the relationship between the president and Congress 
(Cameron 2000; Mayhew 1991), the courts and Congress (Segal 1997; Hettinger and Zorn 
2005), Congress and the bureaucracy (Wood and Waterman 1991; Carpenter 1996; Shipan 
2004), and processes such as judicial nominations which involve all three branches of 
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government (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005; Rhode and Shepsle 
2007). 
Unfortunately, the gender and politics literature has largely ignored these institutional 
crossroads and thereby overlooked the possible effects of gender diversity within this 
interbranch context. Yet, the same theories that explain gender differences in legislative 
behavior should not be expected to stop with bill sponsorship or roll-call voting. If female 
officeholders have a sense of obligation to represent women’s issues, coupled with a 
heightened interest in these matters, then such sentiments should be reflected in all of their 
legislative activities. Therefore, this study theorizes that congresswomen not only represent 
women’s interests through their legislative capacities, but they also work within the system of 
checks and balances to enhance women’s substantive representation in all branches of the 
federal government.  
Evidence of descriptive representation’s interbranch effects can be found in the 
parallel literature on race and politics. Studies in this area have shown that black legislators 
have a positive impact on the levels of political representation afforded to minority interests 
(Canon 1999; Whitby 1998; Tate 2003). In addition, this connection between descriptive and 
substantive representation has been found to extend beyond legislators’ voting behavior and 
into the realm of checks and balances. For example, research in this area has shown that 
minority members of Congress are more likely than white members to participate in 
oversight hearings pertaining to racial issues (Minta 2009). Arguably, by taking the time to 
interject and participate in the process of federal agency policymaking (costly activities with 
likely minimal electoral rewards), minority members of Congress thereby exhibit a greater 
commitment to minorities’ substantive group interests (ibid.). Such evidence also shows how 
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congressional diversity can have a spillover effect that impacts the inner-workings of the 
other branches of government. 
There is also evidence that female voters are cognizant of these institutional 
crossroads and expect officeholders to represent their interests in these interbranch 
capacities. Again, the controversy surrounding Clarence Thomas’s nomination brought these 
concerns to the forefront. When the nomination battle got underway, female voters looked 
to members of Congress (particularly Democratic senators) to protect their interests during 
the confirmation process and thereby in the judicial branch. As one lead activist for a 
women’s rights organization at that time explained: 
 
For years, they [female donors] have been reaching deep into their pockets to help 
protect the Democratic majority in the Senate because they truly believed only a 
Democratic Senate could protect them from an increasingly conservative judiciary 
and an outwardly hostile executive branch. (qtd. in Berke 1991) 
 
The political fallout from the Thomas controversy was clearly seen in the following 
election cycle. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee lost the support of female 
voters—who were previously among the organization’s most solid backers—and several 
women’s rights organizations targeted Democratic senators who voted for Thomas’s 
confirmation (Berke 1991). These electoral consequences suggest that female voters and 
activists did hold senators accountable for failing to represent women’s perceived interests 
within the system of checks and balances. 
 
The Advice and Consent of Women  
This dissertation will test the hypothesis that female senators are more likely than 
their male colleagues to represent women’s issues during the confirmation process for 
nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court. In this sense, the greater commitment and intensity 
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that female officeholders have been found to exhibit for women’s issues during the 
traditional policymaking process is expected to be replicated within the context of 
interbranch relations.  
In recent decades, many important questions of women’s rights have been 
determined in the judicial branch, not the legislative. As Figure 2.2 shows, the 1970s marked 
a new court-centered era for women’s issues as many key components of the feminist 
movement, such as gender equality and reproductive freedoms, were rolled into the broader 
“rights revolution” in American jurisprudence. Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 
and Roe v. Wade (1973) suddenly added a new constitutional component to reproductive and 
family planning matters. During this time, the Court also began recognizing new 
constitutional protections for American women. In 1971, the Court handed down the 
landmark Reed v. Reed ruling, in which the Court ruled for the first time ever that gender 
discrimination was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Once this precedent was set, the floodgates opened and a host of other victims sought 
protection in the courts. In fact, in the three decades following the Reed ruling, the Court 
handed down twenty-nine gender discrimination decisions based on equal protection 
arguments (Mezey 2003: 16). The following chapters theorize that female senators were 
cognizant of this judicialization of women’s rights in America, and therefore used their 
advice and consent powers to defend and promote women’s issues in the judicial branch. 
  
24 
Figure 2.2: Number and Decision Direction of Supreme Court Cases  
Dealing with Gender, 1946-2008 
Note: Data for this graph was collected from The Supreme Court Database (http://scdb.wustl.edu/). 
Cases dealing with sex discrimination (both employment and non-employment based) as well as 
those dealing with abortion and contraceptives are reflected in the reported figures. 
 
 
The Confirmation Setting  
While women’s issues are becoming an increasingly relevant aspect of judicial 
politics, Supreme Court confirmations are multidimensional events that raise a host of 
ideological and non-ideological concerns. There is no written protocol that a senator must 
follow when evaluating a potential justice to the U.S. Supreme Court, and two senators 
evaluating the same nominee may weigh different factors in their decision calculi, including 
the nominee’s background and qualifications, partisan considerations, and an endless litany 
of ideological issues that may come before the Court. 
A benefit of this complex environment is that we will be able to explore potential 
gender differences in an area that is relevant to women’s issues, though it may not 
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necessarily be framed as such. This research design will therefore allow us to see the extent 
to which, if at all, female senators use their power to explicate women’s issues when they are 
embedded within a host of other ideological, political, and institutional constraints. In 
addition, confirmations are intricate proceedings that offer many opportunities for action. 
Senators not only consent to a Supreme Court nomination, they also offer advice—which 
can include a senator vetting a nominee, expressing approval or concern about a particular 
aspect of a nominee’s background, and lobbying his or her fellow colleagues. Such activities 
are often arduous and costly and are therefore particularly useful in assessing senators’ 
“revealed intensities” for the issue in question (Hall 1996).  
On the other hand, this environmental complexity may make it harder for gender 
effects to emerge. Past studies have found differences in the legislative behavior of male and 
female officeholders in seemingly non-gender-related matters (see Kathlene 1995; Hall 
1996), but the largest effects are usually seen in areas that are explicitly gender-related (see 
Osborn and Mendez 2010; Thomas 1989; Swers 2002). In addition, because Supreme Court 
confirmations are not an area in which senators directly consider and vote on a specific 
policy question, when gender effects do emerge, they may be mediated or channeled through 
broader ideological considerations. The following chapters will therefore proceed cautiously 
and spell out exactly how gender effects may manifest themselves during the different stages 
of the confirmation process. 
 
Defining “Women’s Issues” 
As has been pointed out, women are not a monolithic voting bloc with uniform 
ideological and policy preferences. Rather, gender is a broad-based social identity factor that 
encompasses approximately half of the eligible electorate. Furthermore, public opinion polls 
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have consistently failed to uncover significant gender gaps on traditional feminist issues, 
such as attitudes toward abortion and women in the workplace (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; 
Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Thus, labeling a given policy area or even a particular topic as 
a “women’s issue” is a complicated matter in and of itself.  
This dissertation will take a broad approach to the topic of gender and politics by 
looking at issues that directly affect women as a group, such as issues related to women’s 
health and gender equality, as well as those that disproportionately affect women due to 
societal patterns and traditional gender roles, such as social welfare and education issues 
(Thomas 1994; Swers 2002; Osborn and Mendez 2010). When appropriate, the following 
chapters will break up the analysis into subgroups according to how directly a given issue 
affects women as a unified cohort, usually by differentiating among direct women’s issues 
(those that explicitly and systematically impact women as a collective group), traditional 
women’s issues (those that are relevant to women’s interests albeit in an indirect manner), 
and general civil rights issues.3 Based on past studies, I expect the greatest deviation between 
male and female senators to occur when gender is directly relevant to the issue at hand. 
 
Women in the Senate 
This dissertation will also provide a rare look at women in the United States Senate. 
Decades of studies have explored the legislative behavior of female officeholders, but a large 
portion of this work was conducted at the state level. Furthermore, when studies have 
turned their attention to the federal level, they have almost exclusively examined gender 
differences in the House of Representatives.  
                                                 
3 These distinctions are adapted from Osborn and Mendez’s 2010 work, and will be further explained in the 
following chapters.  
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In one sense, these patterns are perfectly understandable and are simply a result of 
women’s scarce representation in the Senate. As displayed in Figure 2.3, women have 
historically constituted only a small minority of that body’s membership. To date, only forty-
four women have ever served in the U.S. Senate, and it took until the 104th Congress for a 
major Senate committee to be chaired by a woman (CAWP: Women in the U.S. Senate 
1922-2013). However, the academic neglect of the women in America’s upper house is 
unfortunate and is becoming increasingly unjustifiable. For one, although women’s 
representation in the Senate has traditionally lagged behind that in the House, recent 
elections have put roughly equal proportions of women in both chambers. In the current 
113th Congress, women actually have a slight edge in the Senate, comprising 20% of that 
body’s membership compared to 17.9% in the House. 
 






The Senate is also interesting to study because of its unique representational 
functions. The American system of bicameralism affords each chamber of Congress with 
specific institutional powers and duties. Due to these differences, senators and 
representatives not only serve in different institutions, they also play different roles. For 
example, senators represent larger geographic areas, serve longer terms, and are expected to 
adopt a more generalist approach to policymaking as compared to their more specialized 
colleagues in the House. Also, the internal workings of the Senate are less formal and 
supposedly less hierarchical. The Senate is often referred to as the world’s greatest 
deliberative body. It is supposed to be a place where political equals engage in unfettered and 
unlimited discussions about the most important issues of the time. 
These institutional differences could have important ramifications for gender 
representation in the two chambers. For example, since senators are expected to serve 
broader representational roles, female senators may have a harder time specializing in and 
championing women’s issues than their colleagues in the House. In addition, while the 
Senate is supposed to be the more egalitarian body, its informal networks and culture of 
norms could be particularly hard for a marginalized member to navigate. This lack of 
institutional structure may pose a challenge to women as they try to advance internally and 
have their voices heard. 
Despite these institutional differences, the scant research that has been conducted on 
female senators tends to substantiate the findings from the broader gender and politics 
literature. Interviews with female senators generally report that they, just like their female 
colleagues in other offices, feel a sense of duty to represent the interests of women. In a 
1996 interview with the Center for American Women and Politics, Senator Barbara Boxer 
(D-CA) reflected on such obligations by noting: 
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There are still so few women in Congress…so you really do have to represent much 
more than your own state…Women from all over the country really do follow what 
you do and rely on you to speak out for them on issues of women’s health care, 
reproductive choice, condition of families, domestic priorities, environment,…equal 
pay for equal work…And I remember when I came [to the Senate], Barbara Mikulski 
said, “Oh, my god, thank god, someone I can share this with,” because she carried 
the load for so long as the only Democratic woman in the Senate. (qtd. in Carroll 
2002: 53) 
 
Some female senators even report that such issues motivated them to get into 
politics in the first place. For example, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) claims that her political 
career began when the Washington state legislature cut funding for a parent-child 
educational program that she was enrolled in. When Murray went to the state capitol to 
lobby on behalf of the program, one legislator crassly remarked, “Lady…You can’t make a 
difference. You’re just a mom in tennis shoes” (qtd. in Whitney 2000: 40). According to 
Murray: 
 
That’s what got me involved in politics. I understood for the first time that the 
decisions government made had an impact on me. And I figured that I could sit at 
home and say ‘Oh, well, that’s too bad,’ or I could get involved and be a part of the 
decision-making process. (qtd. in Whitney 2000: 41-42) 
 
Murray eventually succeeded in getting the parent-child program reinstated. She then 
went on to become the first female senator from the state of Washington, and is currently 
the highest ranking woman in the United States Senate.4    
Research has indicated that female senators not only feel a sense of obligation to 
represent women’s issues, they also act on these issues once in office. In their 2010 work, 
Osborn and Mendez looked at senators’ floor statements in the 106th Congress. Their results 
revealed that female senators were more likely than male senators to speak on issues that 
                                                 
4 Senator Murray is currently the Democratic Conference Secretary, which is the fourth highest ranking party 
leadership position in the Senate. It is interesting to note that the two previous people to occupy this position 
were also women: Senator Barbara Mikulski from 1995-2005 and Senator Debbie Stabenow from 2005-2007.  
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directly affect the lives of women, such as women’s health care and family matters. However, 
there were no significant gender differences in the rate at which male and female senators 
spoke on non-women’s policy issues, such as defense and budget matters.  
Studies have also taken an institutional approach to exploring the representation of 
women in the United States Senate. Here, findings show that female senators are not 
clumped on traditional women’s committees. Rather, their committee membership is broad 
and diverse, which allows them to be involved in a wide array of policy jurisdictions. 
However, the small number of female senators present in any given session, coupled with 
the chamber’s lack of accommodations to compensate for such representational disparities, 
means that female senators still yield a relatively low level of institutional power (Arnold and 
King 2002). 
 
Institutional, Political, and Contextual Constraints 
The existing literature therefore seems to suggest that female officeholders, including 
senators, use their political power to work on behalf of women’s group interests. However, 
this project will not assume an automatic connection in these regards. As Reingold (2008) 
warned, “The link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation is not always 
assured. The existence or strength of that linkage can—and often does—vary across 
individuals, time, and space” (135). The following chapters will therefore recognize and 
explore these intervening factors and contextual nuances.   
One issue that could promote or hinder women’s representation during Supreme 
Court confirmations is access to institutional power. The entire Senate provides advice and 
consent on Supreme Court nominations, but some institutional players are particularly 
powerful during these proceedings. The Judiciary Committee, for example, has come to play 
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an increasingly prominent role during the confirmation process. While the committee does 
not exercise traditional gate-keeping power, actions during this stage of the process are 
vitally important for a nominee’s confirmation prospects. Members of this committee are 
responsible for conducting confirmation hearings. It is here that nominees are vetted and 
where they get to make their initial appeals for confirmation. In addition, these early events 
may be particularly influential in determining which issues get raised and how a nomination 
gets framed. Since women have been historically underrepresented on this committee (even 
in comparison to their already low numbers in the Senate), female senators may have a 
particularly hard time participating in these deliberations.  
Women’s ability to influence the confirmation process may also vary according to 
the party politics in the Senate. Previous research has found that women’s ability to impact a 
variety of congressional proceedings heavily depends on the majority party status in their 
institution (Swers 2002). Research has also shown that Supreme Court confirmations are 
inherently partisan events and are becoming even more so over time (see Shipan 2008). As 
such, this analysis will consider factors such the partisanship of the president and individual 
senators, as well as the overall seat shares in the Senate.        
The amount of attention afforded to gender issues during the confirmation process 
may also be contingent upon the number of women in the Senate. Borrowing from scholars 
who looked at minorities in other majoritarian institutions, such as the corporate 
environment (Kanter 1977), feminist scholars have long theorized that the true impact of 
women’s political representation may not be realized until female officeholders move 
beyond mere token status and instead constitute a critical mass in governing bodies.  
The empirical research on this topic has been rather mixed. Specifically, there 
appears to be a disconnect between the efforts of individual women and the overall 
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legislative output of an institution. Studies have shown that female legislators are more 
devoted to women’s issues when their numbers approach parity, but legislatures with the 
highest proportions of women do not necessarily provide more substantive representation 
than institutions with fewer female officeholders (Thomas 1994). 
Other research has revealed that there are “diminishing returns” in terms of gender 
representation—token female officeholders make a larger marginal impact on the legislative 
process than female officeholders in more gender-balanced institutions (Crowley 2004). One 
possible explanation for these findings is a backlash effect. Studies have found that male 
legislators become increasingly hostile toward their female coworkers when their 
proportional majorities become threatened (Kathlene 1994). Similarly, studies in the U.S. 
House of Representatives have also found that congressmen become less supportive of their 
female partisan colleagues as the proportion of women in their party increases (Kanthak and 
Krause 2010).5 This rising aggression and professional ostracism could hinder women’s 
legislative effectiveness and thereby ultimately impede their ability to impact final policy 
outcomes.  
Since women’s presence in the Senate has fluctuated drastically in recent decades, 
this analysis will afford us the ability to examine gender relations in several different 
institutional environments. Table 2.1 lists the percent of female senators during all Supreme 
Court confirmations over the past three decades. The following analyses will keep these 
numbers in mind and ask if and how the Senate’s gender balance impacted the actions of 
individual senators as well as the overall confirmation process.   
  
                                                 
5 Kanthak and Krause’s study examined member-to-member PAC contributions in the House of 
Representatives from the 105th-108th Congresses.  
33 
Table 2.1: Percent of Female Senators During 
Supreme Court Confirmations Over the Past 30 Years 
Nomination Year Percent Female 
Elena Kagan 2010 17% 
Sonia Sotomayor 2009 17% 
Samuel Alito 2005 14% 
John Roberts, Jr. 2005 14% 
Stephen Breyer 1994 7% 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg 1993 7% 
Clarence Thomas 1991 2% 
David Souter 1990 2% 
Anthony Kennedy 1987 2% 
Robert Bork 1987 2% 
Antonin Scalia 1986 2% 
William Rehnquist6 1986 2% 





The following chapters will test the hypothesis that female senators advocate for 
women’s issues during confirmations to the United States Supreme Court. Despite the 
warnings of theoretical critics, the empirical research indicates that there is a connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation within the context of gender and politics. 
Previous research has substantiated this link in the opinions and beliefs of political elites, as 
well as in a range of legislative behaviors. This research will attempt to expand these findings 
to an interbranch framework that will further elucidate the potential impact of gender 
diversity in America’s highest legislative bodies.  
 
  
                                                 
6 This was Rehnquist’s 1986 nomination, when he was elevated from an associate justice to chief justice.  
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CHAPTER 3
Gender Differences in Confirmation Voting 
 
 When John Roberts replaced William Rehnquist as Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court, he was confirmed by what was then considered an unusually small margin, 
78-22. While all of the Republican senators in the 109th Congress approved of President 
Bush’s nominee for the nation’s highest court, the Democratic senators were evenly divided 
in their support, with 22 voting in favor of Roberts’s confirmation and 22 voting against it.  
To his Democratic opponents, Roberts was a right-wing ideologue who would use 
his place on the Court to chip away at constitutional protections for large classes of 
American citizens. These senators looked to Roberts’s past and highlighted his views on a 
number of controversial issues, including abortion, civil rights, and worker protections. As 
Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) explained in a statement she released: 
 
In case after case, Judge Roberts argued that the Constitution did not protect 
workers, voters, women, minorities and the disabled from discrimination. He also 
argued that the Constitution does not firmly establish the right of privacy for all 
Americans. In all of his memos, writings and briefs, Judge Roberts took the view that 
the Constitution only protects Americans in the most narrow and technical ways, and 
does not convey to us fundamental rights, liberties and freedoms. Because of these 
views, after much deliberation, I have concluded that Judge Roberts is the wrong 
choice for a lifetime appointment as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court—where he may well be making decisions on the rights of our children and 
grandchildren for the next 30 to 40 years. (Stabenow 2005) 
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While half of the Democratic senators shared Stabenow’s characterization of John 
Roberts, the other half painted a drastically different picture of the nominee. To these 
senators, Roberts was a distinguished and acceptable (albeit conservative) choice for the 
Court. As the other Democratic senator from the state of Michigan, Carl Levin, explained:  
 
Judge Roberts possesses extraordinary credentials, suitable for this revered position. 
That he is highly qualified is not in doubt, and to say that he is highly capable is an 
understatement. Judge Roberts has an unusually fine legal mind. His ability to cite 
and synthesize case law has impressed us all. He has great respect for the law, and 
extensive experience arguing cases before the Supreme Court. Judge Roberts is 
articulate and unflappable, with both a judicial temperament and a personal 
demeanor worthy of our highest court. (Levin 2005) 
 
 Why did these two senators—who are members of the same party, represent the 
same state, and are similar ideologically—arrive at such drastically different evaluations of 
John Roberts? Why was ideology a central concern for Senator Stabenow’s voting decision, 
while Senator Levin chose to instead focus on Roberts’s professional qualifications? More 
broadly, why did over half of all Democratic male senators support Roberts’s nomination, 
while only a third of female Democratic senators did so?    
This chapter will add a gender component to the traditional models of confirmation 
voting by contending that female senators weigh Supreme Court nominees’ ideology more 
heavily than male senators when casting confirmation votes. It is theorized that this 
emphasis on ideology reflects female senators’ concern over the impending fate of women’s 
issues in the judicial branch. In this sense, the greater levels of commitment and dedication 
that female officeholders have been found to have for women’s issues in other political 
settings is expected to be similarly carried out in the arena of confirmation politics.    
I will begin by reviewing the literature on Supreme Court confirmations, and then 
provide a brief synopsis of the work on gender and political representation in roll-call voting. 
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Next, I will replicate and extend previous models of confirmation voting by introducing a 
gender component to the analysis. The results revel that gender is a significant, and 
previously overlooked, factor in senators’ decision-making processes during confirmation 
voting. Specifically, the statistical analyses show that female senators are less likely to support 
an ideologically distant nominee than are male senators. Further examination reveals that 
such differences can more accurately be attributed to the ideological voting patterns of 
Democratic female senators. A final analysis confirms that such gender effects hold even 
when controlling for the fact that significant numbers of females have entered the Senate 
only in recent decades, which have been shown to be an ideologically charged time in 
confirmation politics.   
 
Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees 
 Presidents have the privilege of naming nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court, but 
the fate of each such potential justice is decided in the Senate. The confirmation process is 
one of the most prominent examples of checks and balances in the American governmental 
system and has thus garnered much attention from political scientists. Studies in this field 
have covered a range of topics, including strategic considerations at the nomination stage 
(Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005; Rhode and Shepsle 2007), the timing 
of presidential nominations (Shipan, Allen, and Bargen forthcoming), the length of the 
confirmation process (Shipan and Shannon 2003), and why some nominations fail to gain 
Senate approval (Segal 1987; Ruckman 1993; Krutz, Fleisher, and Bond 1998).    
Other scholars have sought to understand how individual senators arrive at voting 
decisions during Supreme Court confirmations. Two seminal pieces have laid the theoretical 
groundwork for this line of inquiry. The first was Cameron, Cover, and Segal’s (hereinafter 
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referred to as CCS) 1990 article. In this article the authors proposed a neoinstitutional 
framework for evaluating confirmation votes, in which senators assess Supreme Court 
nominees on a variety of criteria and eventually arrive at a voting decision that is rooted in 
electoral incentives.  
 The CCS model identified several independent variables that could affect a senator’s 
confirmation vote. Chief among these was ideology, with senators preferring nominees with 
judicial philosophies proximate to their own. Ideology is thus a spatial element, with the 
measure of interest being the squared Euclidean distance between a nominee’s ideology and 
that of a senator.  
While ideology played a central role in the CCS model, four other factors were also 
thought to influence senators’ confirmation votes. Professional competence was proposed as 
a possible factor, with the expectation that less qualified nominees should face harder 
confirmation battles than those with widely recognized credentials. It was also surmised that 
presidential strength should influence the process, with strong presidents having an easier 
time getting their nominees confirmed than weaker presidents. Party was included as another 
possible factor, with members of the president’s party being more likely to support 
nominees than those of the opposing party. Finally, the authors also included an interaction 
between qualifications and ideology, indicating that senators are particularly unlikely to vote 
to confirm a nominee who is perceived as being both unqualified and ideologically distant.  
CCS tested their model in a dataset comprised of over 2,000 confirmation votes, 
covering the nominations of Earl Warren through Anthony Kennedy. Their statistical results 
lend support to all of their proposed hypotheses, with the interaction between qualifications 
and ideology yielding the largest coefficient in the model.  
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 In their 2006 article, Epstein et al. built on CCS’s seminal work. While the underlying 
theoretical story remained essentially the same, the authors did offer some important 
methodological updates to the earlier model. Epstein et al. first expanded the earlier dataset 
to cover the nominations of Hugo Black through John Roberts, thereby raising their N to 
3,709. The authors then offered an updated measure of ideological distance. Unlike CCS, 
Epstein et al. used NOMINATE Common Space scores, as opposed to ADA scores, to 
gauge the ideology of senators.  The authors then employed a bridging technique to translate 
Segal-Cover ideology scores for judicial nominees into Common Space indicators. This new 
measure significantly contributed to the literature by providing an ideological scale that 
crosses institutional barriers, thus allowing for a more direct comparison between the 
ideologies of senators and nominees. Finally, Epstein et al. dropped the interaction term 
between ideology and qualifications, contending that interaction terms are inappropriate and 
unnecessary in probit models.  
 Epstein et al.’s findings essentially echoed those reported by CCS. In addition to 
replicating the original model, the authors also examined the effects of ideology over time. 
This temporal element made it possible for the authors to test the common assertion that 
Supreme Court nominations have become more ideological since Robert Bork’s failed 
nomination in 1987. The authors’ analysis provided general support for such claims. While 
the importance of ideology had been on the rise for three decades prior to Bork’s 
nomination, its coefficient did dramatically increase in the post-Bork era. Thus, Bork’s 
nomination may not have started the fire, but it did fan the flames of ideological divides, 
thereby ushering in a new era of confirmation politics.  
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 While these models identify several important factors that likely influence senators’ 
confirmation votes, the underlying theoretical story remains unsatisfying to a certain extent. 
As CCS note in their conclusion: 
  
The framework assumes senators are ‘single-minded seekers of reelection’, but we 
know this is not so. A more appealing framework would allow senators to trade off 
among competing goals in their roll call votes. In particular, to what extent do 
senators follow the (presumptive) desires of their constituents, and to what extent do 
they ‘shirk’ by voting their personal preferences? (532) 
 
One such factor that has been shown to influence the personal preferences and legislative 
behavior of officeholders is gender.7  
 
Gender and Confirmation Voting 
As discussed in Chapter Two, decades of research has explored potential gender 
differences in legislative behavior. At the state level, studies have shown that female 
officeholders are ideologically more liberal than their male counterparts, and they are more 
likely to promote and support women’s issues during the policy-making process (Thomas 
1994; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Thomas and Welch 1991; Dodson and Carroll 1991).  
As more women got elected to Congress, similar research was conducted at the 
national level. Here again, numerous studies documented differences between the legislative 
behavior of male and female officeholders, including differences in roll-call voting. Early 
                                                 
7 Another factor that is arguably missing from the reviewed literature is public opinion. It is reasonable to 
expect that a senator will look to his or her constituents’ opinions when deciding how to vote on a given 
nominee. However, this study will not attempt to control for public opinion for two reasons. First, there is no 
readily available measure to control for such effects. Public opinion data on Supreme Court nominees has 
only recently been systematically collected, and even then we are left with national and not state specific 
measures (however see Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2008 for recent advancements in this field). Second, the 
studies that have examined the effects of public opinion on confirmation voting have yielded mixed results, 
with some showing it does affect senators’ voting while others find no such evidence (Kastellec, Lax and 
Phillips 2008; Segal, Cameron, Cover 1992; Calderia and Wright 1998) 
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studies examining the voting behavior of female members of Congress found that 
congresswomen were a cohesive group, and that they exhibited more liberal voting patterns 
than their male colleagues (Frankovic 1977; Welch 1985; Vega and Firestone 1995). Even 
stronger evidence has been found to support the claim that gender affects voting on specific 
women’s issue legislation. Studies have uncovered significant differences in voting patterns 
between congressmen and women on a host of gender issues, including bills relating to 
abortion, women’s health services, equality in the workplace, violence against women, and 
family and children’s programs (Tatalovitch and Schier 1993; Dolan 1998; Swers 1998, 
2002). This research has also shown that gender exerts the biggest impact on voting behavior 
when members of Congress are presented with bills that directly impact women—such as 
abortion and reproductive health issues— as opposed to bills where women’s interests are 
more indirect—such as bills relating to children, education, and family matters (Swers 1998).        
Given the importance of the Supreme Court in determining the fate of a variety of 
women’s issues, I hypothesize that these same gender differences will be replicated within 
the context of confirmation voting. However, these effects may be partially masked by the 
complexity of the situation at hand. Confirmation voting is a multi-dimensional event. A 
senator cannot decide to vote in favor of a nominee’s qualification, but vote against his or 
her ideological views (let alone support the nominee’s views on one issue, but oppose them 
on another). Rather, a senator has to assess the totality of the evidence and then judge the 
individual nominee as a whole. Thus unlike the traditional policymaking process—in which 
legislators can usually amend proposals or express support or disapproval for various 
versions of a bill—in the confirmation setting, senators must cast a definitive up or down 
vote.  
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In addition to the senator’s personal evaluation of the nominee, she may also face 
strong institutional and party pressure to support or oppose the president’s pick. While these 
factors are always present in the political landscape, they can be particularly strong during 
confirmation proceedings. Nominating Supreme Court justices is one of the most important 
powers of the chief executive, and a vacancy on the bench may present the president with an 
opportunity to leave a lasting legacy. Thus, pressure from the White House and party leaders 
(especially those of the president’s party) may be noticeably elevated during the consent 
process.  
The one previous study on gender and confirmation voting found that these 
institutional and party considerations largely outweighed gender differences during Supreme 
Court nominations (Swers and Kim 2013). In this study, the authors examined confirmation 
votes for the Roberts and Alito nominations (including the cloture vote on Alito) and found 
little evidence that gender had an overall impact.8 In the end, factors such as party and 
ideology seemed to explain voting patterns—Republican senators lined up behind the 
president’s nominees, while liberal Democrats equally stood in opposition to them. 
However, the authors did find evidence that gender had a significant impact on a subset of 
senators, namely moderate and conservative Democrats.    
This study will build on that of Swers and Kim by extending the range of studied 
nominations and by modeling the effects of gender in a slightly more nuanced manner. 
Specifically, I theorize that gender differences are going to be multiplicative in nature and 
                                                 
8 The authors ran three separate models of Democratic senators’ confirmation votes: one looking at the 
Roberts confirmation, one looking at the Alito cloture vote, and a pooled model looking at both confirmation 
votes and the cloture vote. Gender produced a negative coefficient in all three models, but it was only 
significant in the last one.  
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interact with ideological considerations.9 If a female senator is assessing a nominee based on 
his or her stance on particular policy issues, then the senator is inherently placing a primacy 
on ideology. Thus, I expect that gender differences will be manifested through ideological 
voting, with female senators weighing these factors more heavily in their decision-making 
processes. 
 
Hypothesis: Female senators will be less likely to vote to confirm an ideologically distant nominee 
to the Unites States Supreme Court than will male senators. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
In this section I will test the proposed theory by building on the classic CCS/Epstein 
et al. model.10 The analysis thus begins with the following four variables:  
 
(1) Lack of Qualifications: A measure indicating the perceived professional 
competence of a given nominee. Scores range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing 
the most highly qualified candidates and 1 representing the least qualified 
nominees. Qualification scores were derived by analyzing newspaper editorials 
from the time of the nomination.  
(2) Strong President: A dichotomous variable representing the strength of a president. 
A president was coded as being strong if his party controlled the Senate at the 
time of the nomination and if he was not in the final year of his term.  
(3) Same Party: Senators belonging to the same political party as the president were 
coded as 1, while all others were coded as 0.   
                                                 
9 This methodological change is needed in order to expand the analysis across additional nominations. Swers 
and Kim (2013) only looked at the confirmation votes for Roberts and Alito—both nominees of Republican 
president George W. Bush, and both of whom had questionable views on a variety of women’s issues. Thus, 
Swers and Kim included gender as an independent variable and expected that female senators would be less 
likely to support the nominees. However, when the analysis is extended to additional nominations, there is no 
longer a reason to believe that female senators will be more likely to oppose confirmation.  
10 For this project I will build on Epstein et al.’s dataset, which was graciously made available online at: 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/Bork.html. 
43 
(4) Ideological Distance: Epstein et al.’s Common Space measure of the ideological 
distance between a nominee and a senator. 
The first substantive change I will make is to reintroduce CCS’s interaction term 
between qualifications and ideology. While Epstein et al. agreed with the theoretical 
reasoning behind this term, they did not see a methodological need for its inclusion. 
According to the authors, probit models are inherently non-liner and can thus capture 
conditional relationships among variables without utilizing a multiplicative term. The authors 
contend that an interaction term would offer no additional theoretical value and complicate 
the analysis by yielding results that are not readily interpretable (299).  
While Epstein et al. are correct in asserting that effects in probit models are 
conditional, they err in their conclusion that this relationship eliminates the need for 
interaction terms. Since probit models predict probabilities, they take on an S-shaped 
functional form, which is bounded by a lower point of 0 and an upper point of 1. The effect 
that an independent variable has on the dependent variable thus depends on the location in 
the functional form, with changes in independent variables being felt less when probabilities 
are already near the endpoints (Kam and Franzese 2007: 112). However, if there is a 
theoretical reason for including a conditional relationship beyond that which is implied by 
the given functional form, then the author is justified in modeling that relationship with a 
separate interaction term (Kam and Franzese 2007: 111-113; Nagler 1991). For this reason, 
interaction terms will be included in the proposed model.  
Next, I will add a dichotomous variable indicating the gender of each senator to the 
dataset.11 Since the proposed theory suggests that what we are truly interested in is the 
interaction between gender and ideological distance, a multiplicative term will also be 
                                                 
11 The gender of each senator was determined by consulting the Biographical Directory of the United States 
Congress, available online at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.  
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introduced. While the theory does not predict that gender should be significant on its own, 
the female dummy variable will be retained as a constitutive term in the model (Brambor, 
Clark, and Golder 2006).   
The final methodological revision to the CCS/Epstein et al. model involves 
accounting for the structure of the data. Since the dataset consists of the approximately 100 
votes that were cast for each of forty nominees, it is unrealistic to assume that all of the 
observations are independent (Shipan 2008). While such an assumption may hold for inter-
nominee observations, it likely fails when looking at votes within the same nomination. A 
failure to correct for this multilevel characteristic of the data would essentially over-represent 
the amount of independent information that truly exists, which could result in deflated 
standard errors (Primo et al. 2007). 
In order to account for this aspect of the dataset, I will cluster by nomination. While 
there are alternative methods to correct for such a problem, clustered standard errors have 
been found to be an appropriate, and sometimes preferable, technique for a variety of 
statistical analyses, including probit (Primo et al. 2007). The reliability of the procedure 
increases with the number of clusters, and the forty groupings in the dataset should be 
sufficient to yield reliable results (Primo et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2004). 
 
Analysis 
Table 3.1 displays the results from the traditional CCS/Epstein et al. model (model 
1) as well as the results from the proposed model (model 2). The models are probit analyses 
with the dependent variables being the confirmation votes cast by individual senators (coded 
1 for yeas and 0 for nays). 
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The results of model 1 essentially reflect earlier findings, with the interaction term 
between ideology and qualifications again having the largest substantive impact. However, it 
should be noted that the model does not perform as well as it did in CCS’s article, in which 
they used a truncated dataset and did not correct for the stacked nature of the data. 
The results of model 2 provide support for the theory proposed in this paper. The 
Female*Ideological Distance interaction is negative, statistically significant, and yields one of 
the largest coefficients in the model. Such findings show that female senators weigh ideology 
more heavily than male senators when casting confirmation votes. As expected, the female 
dummy variable is not statistically significant on its own, while the remaining findings closely 
mimic those presented in model 1. 
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Table 3.1: Models of Confirmation Voting 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 







































N 3709 3709 
Log-Likelihood -798.460 -785.03 
Pseudo R2 0.412 0.422 
Note: Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates 
significance at the p.01 level; * denotes significance at the p.05 level. Standard errors are clustered 
by nomination. 
 
While the female/ideology interaction achieved a level of statistical significance, we 
cannot fully assess its impact simply by looking at the coefficient. To make the interaction 
effect more lucid, Figure 3.1 plots the impact that gender has on the probability of a yes vote 
at varying levels of ideological distance. The values in the graph were obtained using King, 
Tomz, and Wittenberg’s CLARIFY statistical software (2000). The y-axis plots first 
difference values, or the probability of a yes vote when the female variable equals 1 minus 
that of when it equals 0. The x-axis plots varying levels of ideological distance, ranging from 
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its minimum at around 0 to its maximum at slightly over 1.2, with its mean located at .1823. 
The remaining dichotomous independent variables were held constant at their mode, while 
all others were held at their mean.   
As the results reveal, the effect of gender starts off small, and then increases as 
ideological distance becomes more extreme. In fact, for the average ideological distance 
there is hardly a noticeable gender effect at all (it seems to emerge slightly above the average 
at .2); however, female senators appear to be significantly less tolerant of ideologically distant 
nominees. 
 
Figure 3.1: Effect of Gender on Voting to Confirm a Supreme Court Nominee 
 
 
Time Period Effects 
The interaction term between gender and ideology seems to reveal that female 
senators are more sensitive to the ideological characteristics of Supreme Court nominees 
than are their male counterparts; however, the current analysis is not yet definitive. For 
























Senate in larger numbers in recent decades, during which time nomination battles have 
become increasingly ideological. As Epstein et al.’s study revealed, the coefficient on 
ideology soared after Bork’s failed 1987 nomination. Since this is roughly the same time 
period in which noticeable numbers of women began to take seats in the Senate, the 
previous findings could be indicative of a time period effect and not distinct gender 
differences.   
In an attempt to separate the effects of these simultaneous events, Table 3.2 shows 
the results of the proposed model within a post-Bork only dataset. As the results show, the 
female interaction term remains significant, although the magnitude of the coefficient 
decreases from –5.867 in the full dataset to -4.967 in the post-Bork era. The continued 
significance of this term suggests that the noted gender effects cannot solely be attributed to 
time period effects. Even within this ideological era of confirmation politics, female senators 
still emerge as more ideological voters than their male counterparts. 
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Table 3.2: Gender Differences in the Post-Bork Era 
Variable Model 1 




























Pseudo R2 .614 
Note: Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates 




 While the chapter thus far has argued that women are more ideological voters in 
Supreme Court confirmations, not all female senators may display these same tendencies. 
One possible factor that could significantly differentiate female senators is partisanship. 
Previous studies have found that party affiliation explains much of the ideological divide 
between male and female legislators. However, significant gender differences have been 
found between members of the same party. These differences are especially pronounced 
within conservative cohorts, such as Republicans and Southern Democrats. For example, 
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studies have found that Republican women are considerably more liberal and more 
supportive of women’s issues than are their co-partisan colleagues (Tatalovitch and Schier 
1993; Vega and Firestone 1995; Welch 1985; Dolan 1998; Swers 1998, 2002).  
Swers and Kim’s 2013 study of gender differences in confirmation voting was 
different in that it found evidence of gender effects among (moderate) Democrats. However, 
these findings are easily understood within the context of partisan politics. Both of the 
nominees in their study—Roberts and Alito—were appointed by Republican president 
George W. Bush. Therefore, Republican senators (male and female alike) were most likely 
subjected to strong party pressure to support the president’s nominees. Previous research 
has shown that party pressure in confirmation voting is strong and has been growing over 
time (Shipan 2008). It is becoming increasingly unlikely that a senator of the president’s party 
will oppose a nomination, even in the face of ideological mismatch. As Shipan explains,  
 
…for members of the president’s party, it takes the combination of questionable 
qualifications and ideological divergence to cause a senator to vote against the 
nominee. Absent both conditions, the senator will vote for the nominee, regardless 
of ideology. (72) 
 
Within the current dataset, most of the modern Supreme Court confirmations took 
place under Republican presidents. Therefore, I anticipate that gender differences between 
male and female Republican senators will be mitigated due to the underlying partisan 
currents and pressure from the White House.    
The analyses in Table 3.3 therefore tests for partisan effects by looking at differences 
in the populations of Democratic and Republican senators. The results reveal some 
interesting findings. First, the noted gender effects are found to be a strictly Democratic 
phenomenon. While such results were expected, the magnitude of the partisan difference is 
quite striking. In the Republican model, the female interaction term is small and statistically 
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insignificant; yet, the Democratic female interaction term is strongly significant and yields 
the largest coefficient in the model.12 Based on these findings, it appears as though 
Democratic female senators are the driving force behind the reported gender differences. 
Ideology plays a significant role in the Democratic model overall, but for female Democratic 
senators, these concerns take center stage.  
The analyses also show other interesting partisan divides. For example, while 
ideology is significant in the Democratic model, it is not significant in the Republican model. 
Lack of qualifications is significant in the Republican model, but not in the Democratic 
model. However, the interaction between ideology and qualifications is significant in both. 
In addition, the overall model performs slightly better in the Democratic dataset, with a 
pseudo R-squared of .474 compared to .381.  
  
                                                 
12 While the independent female dummy variable is also found to be significant in the Democratic model, I 
have no theoretical explanation for this finding and suspect that such results are again related to particular 
partisan contexts of the nominations under investigation. 
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Table 3.3: Gender Effects in Confirmation Voting, by Party 
Variable Model 1: Republicans Model 2: Democrats 










































N 1498 2203 
Log-Likelihood -257.375 -485.246 
Pseudo R2 .381 .474 
Note: Cell entries are probit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. ** indicates 




This analysis has built on previous models of confirmation voting by introducing a 
gender component. The results reveal that male and female senators (and more specifically 
female Democratic senators) do evaluate Supreme Court nominees differently, with the latter 
weighing ideology more heavily than the former when casting a confirmation vote. 
Importantly, these results hold even after controlling for the fact that significant numbers of 
females have entered the Senate only in recent decades.      
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The reported results have something to offer both the broader literature on gender 
and politics as well as that on Supreme Court confirmations. First, the analysis highlights 
how senators’ personal characteristics and opinions can influence their behavior during the 
confirmation process. CCS were right—their framework did need to be expanded to account 
for the competing goals and preferences of individual senators.  
Second, the presented results uncover new connections between descriptive and 
substantive representation. This marriage of gender and confirmation politics is also a 
theoretically interesting extension. Previous research has shown gender differences in 
legislative activities that are explicitly gender related, but the connection in confirmation 
politics is more implicit. Women’s rights are not necessarily at the forefront of confirmation 
politics, and senators can consider a variety of characteristics when evaluating a given 
nominee. This complex environment thus provided an opportunity to examine if female 
senators use their power to explicate issues related to women’s rights when these issues are 
embedded within other ideological and non-ideological concerns. It appears as though they 
do.  
The presented results uncover interesting patterns of confirmation voting, but 
several questions remain. While the statistical analyses seem to support the claim that female 
senators give more weight to ideology than male senators during confirmations to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the proposed theory offers a more detailed explanation of these ideological 
differences—namely, that they are rooted in a connection between the descriptive 
representation of female legislators and the substantive representation of women’s interests. 
Further exploration of this hypothesis will require an unpacking of the “ideology” variable 
used in this analysis. If the proposed theory is correct, then we should be able to observe 
specific ideological differences between male and female senators. To get at this piece of the 
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puzzle, we need to know more detailed information about the types of ideological 
considerations that are behind the reported findings. In other words, we need to know 
which specific issues female senators had in mind when they cast their confirmation votes. 
The following chapters will therefore take a closer look at the gender differences by 
exploring senators’ legislative activities during floor debates and confirmation hearings.  
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CHAPTER 4
Girl Talk: Female Senators’ Floor Statements  
on Supreme Court Nominees 
 
The previous chapter revealed that female senators weigh ideology more heavily than 
male senators when casting confirmation votes for Supreme Court nominees. While 
confirmation voting is the final and most studied aspect of the confirmation process, several 
important steps precede that endpoint. This chapter will step back and analyze an earlier but 
no less critical stage in the confirmation process—senators’ floor statements regarding 
Supreme Court nominees. Floor statements are an important aspect of the Senate’s 
confirmation proceedings. They provide senators with an opportunity to explain their voting 
decisions, appease given constituencies, and perhaps even persuade their colleagues. 
Important for this dissertation, floor statements also offer senators the opportunity to 
highlight certain issues and scrutinize the nominee’s past.  
This chapter will therefore move beyond voting and ask if female senators use their 
time on the Senate floor to openly act as advocates for women’s rights in the context of 
Supreme Court nominations. The following research aims to provide a rich descriptive 
analysis of male and female senators’ floor behavior during confirmation proceedings. This 
in-depth examination will explore the rates of participation for male and female senators, as 
well as the types of statements senators make. The following analysis could also help 
contextualize the results in Chapter Three. The previous chapter revealed that female 
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senators are more ideological voters than male senators, but such findings do little in the way 
of explaining why. Floor statements allow a senator to articulate the logic behind a vote in 
his or her own words. Such statements will therefore be useful tools to help uncover the 
underlying causes that explain the observed gender differences in voting patterns. 
 This chapter will begin with a discussion of the importance of floor speeches, 
followed by a more tailored discussion of these activities in the Unites States Senate. Next, I 
will review literature that specifically deals with gendered patterns of speech within legislative 
contexts. The methodology section will then provide an in-depth content analysis of five 
Supreme Court nominations—those of Sandra Day O’Connor, David Souter, Stephen 
Breyer, John Roberts, and Sonia Sotomayor. The results reveal that female senators do bring 
a unique perspective to confirmation proceedings by acting as vocal champions and 
defenders of women’s rights. 
 
The Importance of Floor Statements  
 Legislators have a lot of activities competing for their time: they need to raise 
campaign money, make public appearances, do casework for their constituents, perform 
committee work, draft legislation, and research and vote on bills. Why, then, would an 
officeholder take the time to prepare and deliver a floor statement? If talk is cheap, why 
would a policymaker prioritize speaking on an issue over another form of legislative action?
 At first glance, floor statements may seem like time-intensive activities with minimal 
potential rewards. However, there are several benefits that legislators can receive from 
engaging in these tasks. One major prospective payoff is electoral incentives. In his seminal 
1974 book, Mayhew described a world where congressmen are “single-minded seekers of re-
election” (5), a view that has been widely embraced by legislative scholars. Mayhew went on 
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to identify three types of activities that congressmen engage in while attempting to further 
their personal electoral interests. One such activity is position taking, which Mayhew defines 
as the “public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to 
political actors” (61). According to Mayhew, congressmen do not necessarily have to 
produce legislative outcomes in order to reap electoral rewards. Rather, the very act of 
uttering a position can be politically advantageous. As Mayhew explains: 
 
The congressman as position taker is a speaker rather than a doer. The electoral 
requirement is not that he make pleasing things happen but that he make pleasing 
judgmental statements. The position itself is the political commodity. (62)        
 
Floor statements afford legislators an ideal opportunity to engage in position taking. 
Through floor speeches, politicians can explain their votes and pay lip service to observant 
constituencies. In this sense, floor speeches are intended to speak to an audience beyond the 
institution’s walls. In addition, such activities are becoming increasingly important as 
technology has opened up many governmental proceedings and made it easier than ever for 
politicians to publicize their floor speeches. In the U.S. Congress, C-SPAN and C-SPAN2 
bring officeholders right into viewers’ living rooms. Many members of Congress now also 
post links to their floor speeches on their websites and Twitter feeds.13       
Beyond electoral considerations, politicians may find other potential benefits from 
speaking on the floor. For example, a congressman motivated by good public policy 
(subjectively defined) may find that these opportunities offer him a captive audience and a 
soapbox from which to espouse his views. A member of Congress may also take the floor in 
hopes that her statements will help frame the context of a debate or perhaps even persuade 
one of her colleagues to adopt her viewpoint.   
                                                 
13 C-SPAN began broadcasting House proceedings in 1979, and C-SPAN 2 was launched for the Senate in 
1986. See Fenno (1989) for an interesting summary of the debate surrounding the televising of Senate affairs.   
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In short, floor speeches give legislators the opportunity to publically engage in 
political conversations. While this type of legislative participation has several potential 
payoffs, it does require notable effort on the speaker’s behalf. Not only does the legislator 
have to take the time to prepare and deliver the remarks, but, in addition, by publically 
articulating his or her views, the legislator can become a type of advocate or spokesperson 
for the issue. Thus, the act of delivering a floor statement may be a useful signal about how 
intensely a policymaker feels about the issue at hand (Hall 1996). 
 
Floor Statements in the United States Senate  
 Floor speeches therefore offer broad political appeal to all officeholders, but such 
activities are especially important in the United States Senate (Smith 1995; Schneier and 
Gross 1993). A popular historical story that captures the raison d’etre of the Senate involves a 
lively exchange between Thomas Jefferson (who was abroad during the Constitutional 
Convention) and George Washington. According to the story, Jefferson and Washington 
dined together shortly after Jefferson’s return. During the meal, Jefferson asked Washington 
why the delegates at the convention decided to create a Senate. Washington responded by 
comparing the Senate to a tea saucer—just as a tea saucer helps cool off the tea, the Senate 
helps cool off the legislative process.14   
As discussed in Chapter Two, the United States Senate was deigned to be a 
deliberative legislative body. One institutional feature that slows down and “cools off” the 
policymaking process is the ability of senators to engage in open and extended debate. While 
some scholars have claimed that such institutional arrangements have more to do with 
                                                 
14 For some historical information and an account of this story, visit the Senate’s legislative page: 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Senate_legislative_process.htm.  
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protecting senators’ individual political interests than about a blind fidelity to the institution’s 
deliberative nature (Binder and Smith 1998), it is clear that floor speeches hold an important 
place in the institution’s political culture. This reflective nature affects all Senate business, 
including debate over Supreme Court nominations. Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN) 
expressed this sentiment during John Roberts’s confirmation proceedings when he urged his 
colleagues to have an open and thorough confirmation, noting that: 
 
We [members of the Senate] pride ourselves on being the greatest deliberative body 
in the world. This is our moment to show that to the country and the world. Let us 
do it right. (Congressional Record, July 20, 2005: S8504)   
 
 Even though the Senate was designed to be the more deliberative chamber, most of 
the research on floor activities (like most research on Congress in general) tends to focus on 
the U.S. House of Representatives. However, the few studies that have looked inside the 
Senate generally support the broader legislative theories in this area. For example, floor 
activities in the Senate appear to be at least partially motivated by electoral considerations, as 
scholars have found that senators use floor speeches as an opportunity to symbolically 
represent and connect with members of their constituency (Hill and Hurley 2002). Research 
has also shown that other political and institutional factors—such as committee 
membership, party affiliation, and election cycles—can also affect the likelihood of a senator 
deciding to speak on the Senate floor (Osborn and Mendez 2010; Hill and Hurley 2002).   
There is also evidence that such tactics have been increasingly used in recent 
decades. Several scholars have written about the change of the Senate from a 
“communitarian” institution to a more “individualistic” body (Sinclair 1985, 1986; Fenno 
1989; Smith and Flathman 1989). As Fenno (1989) explained, “The communitarian 
Senate…was a markedly self-contained, self-regulated, inward-looking institution” (315). In 
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these earlier times, the Senate functioned more like a team sport. In this institutional setting, 
senators knew their positions, guarded the field from outsiders, and had a deep respect for 
the game.   
However, for various reasons, the Senate’s team spirit began to disintegrate in the 
1980s. According to Fenno:  
 
Changing political processes—more openness, more special interest group 
participation, more media visibility, more candidate-centered elections, weaker 
partisan ties and party organizations—produced newcomers with an ever stronger 
sense of political independence. (317)  
 
In this “individualistic” Senate, team players were replaced by independent maverick 
superstars. Senators began looking more and more to the outside world and acting in their 
own political best interests. Soon the prevailing game in the Senate transitioned from a team 
to more of a solo sport.   
Autonomous and visible actions, such as speaking on the floor, fit particularly well in 
this new senator-focused Senate. After all, a senator cannot pass a bill on his own, but he can 
talk about doing so. As a result of these new priorities and incentives, the Senate floor has 
seen heavier traffic in recent decades, and Senate leadership has even had to change their 
governing tactics to accommodate this increased demand (Smith and Flathman 1989).  
 
Female Legislators Speaking as Women 
 Floor speeches are therefore an important part of the legislative process—especially 
in the United States Senate—and the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring 
potential gender differences in these activities. As mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, 
decades of previous research have documented gender differences in roll-call voting 
patterns. Again, the predominant underlying theory of these studies is that female legislators 
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use their power and political positions to advocate for women’s issues, variously defined. 
This chapter will build on and extend this logic to see if these same gender differences are 
discernible in this other aspect of legislative behavior. 
 The following research will also be particularly useful in helping us better understand 
the gender differences in confirmation voting that were uncovered in the previous chapter. 
While the results in Chapter Three revealed that female senators are more ideological voters 
when it comes to approving Supreme Court nominees, we have no way of knowing if these 
differences are linked to concerns about women’s issues. By analyzing floor statements, we 
will get to hear senators articulate a rationale for their voting decision in their own words. 
 Previous research has shown that textual and discourse analyses can be useful tools 
to gain a deeper understanding of the surface-level gender differences that are observable in 
legislative patterns. In her 1995 work, Kathlene analyzed transcripts from interviews with 
forty-seven Colorado state legislators. Her interviews revealed that male and female 
legislators viewed crime and recidivism through fundamentally different lenses. Female 
legislators were more likely to take into consideration contextual factors, and saw criminals 
as bounded agents working within a constrained (and often severely limited) environment. 
Male legislators, on the other hand, were less likely to take such mitigating circumstances 
into consideration and were therefore more likely to see the criminal as possessing sole 
responsibility for his or her actions. Kathlene theorized that such differences were the result 
of gendered socialization patterns that taught men to see individuals as autonomous beings, 
while women were taught to embrace a more contextualized worldview. Interestingly, and 
perhaps most importantly for this research, these philosophical differences were reflected in 
the types of legislation that male and female legislators sponsored on this matter. Female 
legislators were far more likely to introduce bills that had a broader approach to crime, such 
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as bills looking at criminal prevention and intervention tactics as well as legislation focused 
on providing assistance to victims of crime.        
Floor statements offer another opportunity to glean a glimpse of the philosophical 
roots that lead to emergent gender differences in legislative behavior. In addition, they are 
also an indication of how active male and female policymakers are on given matters. In his 
1996 book on legislative participation in Congress, Hall found significant gender differences 
in the rates of participation in floor activities in three of the six House bills he examined. 
While two of the bills were relevant to issues on the Women’s Caucus agenda at that time, 
one bill (the 1981 Farm Bill), was less directly relevant to women’s issues. However, the 
congresswomen used their floor time to highlight how aspects of the Farm Bill did, in fact, 
impact women’s lives. As Hall explained:     
 
The record suggests that in an important way, the peanuts title did evoke the 
concerns of low-income women—concerns that were altogether submerged in policy 
development in this area prior to 1981. None of the women who participated on the 
House floor represented peanut-producing districts and none spoke in support of 
peanut producers; rather, all of them called attention to the program’s effect on the 
price of peanut butter and hence the cost to the care providers for low-income 
children. (209) 
 
The Farm Bill is a good example of how female legislators can use their floor 
statements to articulate a woman’s perspective on a given piece of legislation. Through their 
words, female policymakers can reframe an issue in gendered terms. This case is also a good 
reminder of how broad and diverse “women’s issues” can be, and it provides support for the 
idea that female legislators (at least sometimes) speak on behalf of a larger women’s 
constituency that extends beyond their own electoral district.     
While Hall’s study looked at floor participation in the House, others have found 
similar findings in the United States Senate. In their 2010 study, Osborn and Mendez 
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conducted a content analysis of floor speeches in the 106th United States Senate. The authors 
constructed a coding scheme that divided floor statements into one of three policy realms: 
direct women’s issues, traditional women’s issues, and non-women’s policy issues. Direct 
women’s issues included policy domains that explicitly affect women as a constituency, 
including abortion and other matters related to women’s health and safety. Traditional 
women’s issues, by contrast, were those policy domains that tended to disproportionately 
impact women due to gendered social patterns. Policies in this category included health care, 
education, family matters, and general social welfare issues. Finally, non-women’s issues were 
policy areas that did not appear to have a significant (direct nor indirect) gender component. 
Policies in this area included matters such as defense and monetary issues.  
After analyzing 3.5 million lines of text, the authors found that female senators did in 
fact devote a higher percentage of their floor statements to women’s issues. The strongest 
gender differences were found in issues that directly impact women’s lives. Female senators 
devoted proportionally more of their floor statements to matters such as women’s healthcare 
and safety than did their male colleagues. Perhaps because of its salience in the overarching 
political landscape, abortion was the one direct women’s issue that men and women touched 
on at roughly the same rate. Women were also more vocal advocates for some of the 
traditional and non-women’s issues—such as family and foreign policy matters—but overall 
the evidence of gender differences in these categories was much more sporadic.    
Even more relevant to this study, Swers and Kim (2013) found that female senators 
were more likely than male senators to speak about women’s issues during confirmations to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In this study, the authors looked at the political circumstances 
surrounding the replacement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—the first female member of 
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the Court—and the accompanying nominations of John Roberts and Samuel Alito.15 Despite 
the nominees’ questionable support of women’s rights, the authors found little evidence that 
gender affected final confirmation voting. However, the authors did find that female 
senators, particularly Democratic female senators, were more likely to raise issues of concern 
to women throughout the confirmation proceedings. After analyzing floor statements, 
statements of Judiciary Committee members, and press releases, the authors found that 
Democratic female senators were more likely than their male co-partisans to talk about 
women’s issues during both nominations.16 Overall, Republicans talked about these matters 
at a lower rate than Democrats. In addition, the gender differences that were present in the 
Democratic cohort were not present among Republican senators.  
The current chapter builds on these previous studies and similarly expects that 
female senators will use their floor time to vocalize a distinct woman’s point of view. 
However, since this study will extend the analysis across multiple nominations that span 
several decades, there are many historical and institutional variables that may influence 
female senators’ overall participation at this stage of the confirmation proceedings. Unlike 
the analysis of confirmation voting in the previous chapter (where every senator 
automatically gets an equal vote), the legislative participation in this chapter becomes 
somewhat contingent upon institutional position, power, and access. One potentially 
important factor that could influence women’s participation during floor debates is simply 
the overarching cultural and institutional gender dynamics.   
                                                 
15 President Bush first nominated John Roberts to fill O’Connor’s seat. However, Bush withdrew this 
nomination and re-nominated Roberts for the position of chief justice after the death of William Rehnquist. 
Samuel Alito was then nominated to fill O’Connor’s associate justice position.   
16 Similar to Osborn and Mendez (2010), Swers and Kim (2013) also found that there was not a significant 
gender gap when it came to addressing the issue of abortion.   
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First, women are severely under-represented in the Senate, especially throughout 
many of the nominations under examination here. While this token status may increase the 
pressure on female senators to speak on behalf of a women’s constituency, their minority 
role could ultimately hinder their ability to function within the institutional structures and 
hierarchy. As critical mass theorists have noted:  
 
Tokens appear to operate under a number of handicaps in work settings. Their 
possible social isolation may exclude them from situations in which important 
learning about a task is taking place and may also prevent them from being in a 
position to look good in the organization. (Kanter 1977: 987)    
 
Indeed, many of the women who have served in the Senate were not in institutional 
positions that encourage participation during judicial confirmation proceedings (e.g., no 
woman has ever served in a leadership position in the Senate, and only a handful of women 
have held seats on the Senate Judiciary Committee). Such institutional barriers may be less of 
a roadblock in the Senate, where legislators are seen more as broad generalists, than in the 
House Representatives, where there is stronger pressure on legislators to specialize in policy 
domains. Nevertheless, the low number of female senators coupled with their institutional 
positioning may result in a muting of women’s voices throughout the entire course of the 
deliberations.  
Female senators may also face other cultural barriers when making floor speeches. 
Although the Senate is supposedly a chamber of equals, any time social interactions (such as 
speech) come into play, one should be aware of the possibility of inequality and informal 
dominance. Several studies have found that women have a particularly hard time getting 
their voices heard in legislative settings. In her 1994 analysis of state committee hearings, 
Kathlene found that “female committee members engage later [in the conversation], speak 
significantly fewer words, take significantly fewer turns, and make and receive fewer 
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interruptions than their male counterparts” (569). Somewhat contrary to the expectations of 
critical mass theory, Kathlene actually found that male committee members had increasingly 
hostile and aggressive speech patterns as the percent of female committee members grew.17     
Gender has also been found to affect how government officials receive witnesses 
during congressional hearings. In her 1998 article, Mattei utilized discourse analysis 
techniques to analyze the Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearings on the nomination of David 
Souter to the U.S. Supreme Court. While women accounted for 40% of the hearing’s 
witnesses, the effectiveness of their testimonies was undermined by prevailing gender 
dynamics—senators interrupted female witnesses at a higher rate than male witnesses; male 
witnesses were given proportionally more floor time to speak; and female witnesses were 
more likely to have their testimonies and expertise openly challenged. Thus, while women 
were physically present during the deliberations, they were not necessarily equal partners in 
the conversation. 
Because of these findings, the following analysis will be cognizant of gendered 
barriers to legislative speech, and will therefore begin by asking if female senators are 
speaking on the Senate floor at the rate at which they should. However, the bulk of the 
analysis will be primarily concerned with assessing the issues that male and female senators 
address in their floor speeches, with the expectation that female senators will place a higher 
priority on women’s issues.  
Hypothesis: Female senators will be more vocal advocates for women’s issues  
during their floor statements than their male counterparts. 
 
                                                 
17 Other research has also found that male officeholders become less supportive of their female colleagues as 
the percent of women in the legislative setting increases. For example, Kanthak and Krause (2010) examined 
member-to-member leadership PAC contributions in the U.S. House of Representatives from the 105th 
Congress through the 108th. Their results revealed that male-to-male contributions increased but male-to-
female contributions decreased as more women entered the chamber.   
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Data and Methods  
 The proposed content analysis will be performed on Senate floor statements from 
five Supreme Court nominations: those of Sonia Sotomayor, John Roberts, Stephen Breyer, 
David Souter, and Sandra Day O’Connor. These nominations were chosen because they 
offer a range of theoretically interesting political and institutional settings. As displayed in 
Table 4.1, these cases include two examples of a Democratic nomination going to a 
Democratic Senate, two examples of a Republican nomination going to a Republican Senate, 
and one case of a divided government nomination. The selected cases also offer analytical 
leverage by including three male and two female nominees, and valuable historical 
perspective by spanning the course of three decades. The number of female senators also 
fluctuates across the nominations, from a low of two during O’Connor’s confirmation to a 
high of seventeen during Sotomayor’s confirmation.   
For each nomination, I began by first collecting all floor statements that senators 
made in which the nomination in question was the primary topic of focus. To do this, I 
searched the Congressional Record (which I accessed through Thomas and Lexis-Nexis) for 
the nominee’s name, beginning with the date the nomination was officially announced by the 
president and ending with the date of the Senate’s final confirmation vote. For each returned 
hit, I then looked to see if the senator’s statement was primarily about the nominee, or if the 
senator was simply mentioning the nominee’s name in passing. For example, statements that 
were merely talking about the order of business in the Senate (e.g., “This week the Senate 
will begin consideration of the following nominations…”) and other statements where the 
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Democratic Party 17 
John Roberts 2005 
George W. Bush 
(R) 
Republican Party 14 
Stephen Breyer 1994 Bill Clinton (D) Democratic Party 7 
David Souter 1990 
George H.W. 
Bush (R) 
Democratic Party 2 
Sandra Day 
O’Connor 
1981 Ronald Reagan (R) Republican Party 2 
 
 
Coding of the Dependent Variable 
Once a statement was identified as dealing with the given Supreme Court 
nomination, the following coding rubric was applied. First, the entire statement was divided 
into substantive and procedural components. Procedural words were simply floor utterances 
that were of a technical or otherwise non-germane nature. These included things like a 
senator asking how much floor time she had left, yielding the floor, asking for something to 
be inserted into the Congressional Record, or thanking the presiding officer. Since these 
statements offer no insight into the senator’s views on the nominee, they were dropped from 
the analysis. The remainder of the senator’s statements—those that somehow specifically 
addressed the nominee or the impending confirmation vote—were classified as substantive.  
 Substantive statements were then assessed to see if the remark dealt with a specific 
women’s issue. While “women’s issues” have been variously defined throughout the 
literature, I followed in the footsteps of Osborn and Mendez (2010) and developed a coding 
rubric that classifies statements into different categories depending on how relevant the issue 
is to a broad constituency of women. Specifically, the following four categories were used:  
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1. Direct Women’s Issues: Direct women’s issues are those that directly affect 
women as a constituency. Statements in this category are either inherently 
gender-related, or are explicitly framed in such a way as to highlight the 
issue’s impact on women. Issues in this category include things like violence 
against women, matters related to women in the workplace (e.g., maternity 
leave, gender discrimination, sexual harassment, etc.), gender diversity on the 
Court, abortion, and other issues related to women’s healthcare. Since issues 
in this classification are the most relevant to women’s substantive group 
interests, this will be the primary classification of interest. In addition, 
previous studies have suggested that female officeholders make the biggest 
legislative impact on policy areas that are the most directly relevant to 
women’s lives (Osborn and Mendez 2010; Day 1994; Tatalovitch and Schier 
1993; Swers 1998; Dolan 1998; Swers 2002), so I expect to find the biggest 
gender differences on these matters.  
 
2. Traditional Women’s Issues: Traditional women’s issues are those that 
disproportionately impact women. Their relevance to women as a 
constituency is not automatic or biological. Rather, it is primarily based on 
prevailing gender norms in which women predominately operate in the 
private sphere and are viewed as society’s natural caregivers. Specific policy 
issues that fall into this category include things like healthcare, family matters, 
childcare, education, and other general social welfare issues (e.g., direct 
assistance programs for low-income individuals and families including 
Medicaid, food stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, or, in 
earlier years, Aid to Families with Dependent Children).18 
 
3. Civil Rights Issues: Some issues—such as affirmative action, diversity, and 
discrimination—affect female constituents but may be raised in regards to 
another minority group or framed as broader questions of general civil rights. 
                                                 
18 According to the United States Census, women and children are still disproportionately affected by poverty. 
In 2011, 13.6% of men and 16.3% of women were living in poverty. Children under the age of 18 had an even 
higher poverty rate of 21.9%. (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith: 2012).  
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The third women’s category captures these policy matters. Building on The 
Supreme Court Database Codebook, these issues include “non-First 
Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications” that are socially 
and politically relevant (43). Because some direct women’s issues are a subset 
of larger civil rights matters, these two categories may overlap at times. In 
these situations, direct women’s issues trump civil rights issues. For example, 
if a statement talked about affirmative action programs for women, then it 
was coded as a direct women’s issue statement. However, if a statement 
talked about affirmative action programs in general or for another group, 
then it was coded as a civil rights issue statement.   
 
4. Privacy Issues: Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and Roe v. Wade 
(1973) firmly placed the issues of abortion and access to contraceptives 
within a broader legal context of privacy rights. While these policy issues are 
now firmly entrenched in the battles over the right to privacy, many other 
issues—everything from homosexuality to the War on Terrorism—also raise 
these concerns. A final issue category was created to account for statements 
that touched on the constitutional right to privacy. Again, direct women’s 
issues will at times overlap with privacy issues. In fact, in many instances, 
“right to privacy” is almost used as a code phrase for abortion and 
reproductive freedoms. Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) commented on this 
tendency during Souter’s confirmation when he stated: 
 
All of us know that one of the inseparable aspects of a right to 
privacy is the right for a woman to choose whether or not to have an 
abortion. Indeed when the question of the right to privacy was raised 
in the Judiciary Committee, Judge Souter appeared to presume that it 
was nothing more than a euphemism for the right to a safe and legal 
abortion. (Congressional Record, September 26, 1990: S13891) 
 
Senator Bradley went on to talk about the right to privacy in the 
arenas of contraceptive and reproductive health policies. However, he ended 
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his remarks by reminding his colleagues that privacy rights also pertain to 
other important social issues, such as limitations on governmental intrusions.   
The coding rubric handles the overlap of privacy and direct women’s 
issues the same way it did with the civil rights category. In situations where 
privacy issues are explicitly raised in regards to abortion and family planning 
matters, direct women’s issues trump privacy issues. However, if a statement 
only talked about a general right to privacy or if it raised other policy matters 
related to privacy issues, then it was coded as a privacy issue statement. Thus, 
when Senator Bradley talked about a women’s right to choose, it was coded 
as a direct women’s issue. When he talked about limits on governmental 
intrusions, it was coded as a privacy issue statement. 
 
All women’s issue statements were then coded in terms of policy stance. This next 
level of analysis was added to give some insight into the types of policy positions that 
senators were espousing during their floor statements—after all, two senators could talk 
about the exact same issue for the same amount of time, but have drastically different 
viewpoints on the matter. To account for this potential variation, coded statements were 
marked as pro if the comment advocated for the continued or increased protection of the 
women’s issue under consideration. By contrast, coded statements were marked as con if the 
comment articulated a position that wanted to repeal protections in these areas, or if the 
statement expressed disregard for the rights of the group in question. Statements were coded 
as neutral if they touched on the subject but did not clearly articulate a policy position on the 
matter. 
72 
The following three examples illustrate these different policy stances in regards to a 
single high-profile women’s issue—abortion. In the first example, Senator Barbara Boxer 
(D-CA) is describing how she, in a recent campaign advertisement, pledged her support for a 
woman’s right to choose, and how she viewed John Roberts’s appointment to the Court as a 
potential threat to that commitment:      
 
I said in my own words, right in that commercial, I would do everything in my power 
to ensure that we never go back to those dark days of back-alley abortions, when 
thousands of women died and many others were rendered infertile. We know that 
Judge Roberts signed a brief calling for Roe to be overturned…To simply say Roe is 
precedent…is not good enough. (Congressional Record, September 21, 2005: S10275) 
 
Since Boxer was talking about an issue that directly affects women, and she was articulating a 
desire for continued legal protection in this area, this was coded as a pro/direct women’s 
issue statement. Throughout the course of the confirmation, other senators touched on this 
same issue, but expressed clear opposition to a women’s right to choose. These sentiments 
were therefore coded as con/direct women’s issue statements. One such statement was 
delivered by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS):     
 
Some of my colleagues have argued that…a right to abortion has been beneficial to 
women. They argue the right to abortion has ‘freed’ them to pursue goals as full 
participation in the workforce. But there are certain other effects of this right which 
should be identified…I have pointed out repeatedly that in the wake of Roe, 40 
million children have been aborted in America—40 million souls who could have 
brightened our existence and made their contribution to the habits of the American 
heart. (Congressional Record, September 28, 2005: S10532)  
 
Other statements, such as the following quote from Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), touched 
on the issue of abortion, but either did so in passing or did not clearly articulate a view on 
the matter. These statements were therefore coded as neutral/direct women’s issues:  
 
73 
Since I believe it is inappropriate, for example, to ask about an issue realistically likely 
to come before the Court, I did not ask whether he [John Roberts] would sustain or 
overrule Roe v. Wade. (Congressional Record, September 19, 2005: S10170)  
 
The coding rubric also established other procedural guidelines for the content 
analysis. First, only entire sentences were coded. If a sentence touched on a women’s issue, 
then all words in that sentence were coded. Since a single sentence can raise a multitude of 
issues simultaneously, this system could result in the coding of irrelevant words. For 
example, during Sotomayor’s confirmation, Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) noted that, “At 
one point, the Republican Party argued for precedent and for strict construction because 
they wanted to push back on certain new precedents that they thought were beyond the 
Constitution—precedents such as Roe and Miranda (Congressional Record, August 5, 2009: 
S8817). This was coded as a direct women’s issue statement, even though the sentence also 
touched on the rights of criminal suspects and broader issues of judicial philosophy and the 
appropriate use of precedent.   
While the following analysis will primarily rely on individual word counts, coding was 
done in this sentence-by-sentence manner for several reasons. First, coding at such a micro-
level as individual words is nearly impossible since a certain amount of context is needed to 
interpret any verbal utterance. Alternatively, we could have coded entire paragraphs at a 
time. However, transcriptions in the Congressional Record are not always clearly laid out in a 
neat paragraph form. In addition, many senators switched topics or stances throughout the 
course of their statements, and a chunkier coding approach may have missed some of those 
nuances. Breaking statements down by sentence therefore seemed like a sensible middle-of-
the-road approach that most accurately captured the complexities of the statements that 
were delivered.    
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The coding rubric also allows statements to be coded for multiple measures. This 
rule accounts for the fact that some statements talk about multiple topics in conjunction 
with one another. For example, during John Roberts’s confirmation, Senator Jon Corzine 
(D-NJ) stated: 
 
I have been struck, in listening to the statements of many of my colleagues who have 
struggled with how to vote on this nomination, by the simple fact that we are all 
guessing—guessing if Judge Roberts will uphold the right to privacy, guessing if he 
will restrict the right of a woman to choose…guessing if he will support the gains we 
have made in the area of civil rights during the past 40 years. (Congressional Record, 
September 29, 2005: S10638) 
 
Since Corzine’s statements touched on three of the four issue categories—direct women’s 
issues, privacy issues, and civil rights—it was triple coded.   
Again, there are tradeoffs to this approach. The downside is that this multiple-coding 
may artificially inflate a senator’s statements in the analysis (i.e., the same sentence could get 
counted multiple times). However, the only alternative would be to prioritize the different 
categories and—beyond the previously noted exceptions where direct women’s issues are 
framed as a subset of the broader civil rights and privacy classifications—I have no 
theoretical reason to create such a hierarchy. In addition, the sentence-by-sentence approach 
to coding reduced the amount of words that needed to be double coded, and the following 
analyses will often be broken down by single issue-areas.     
Finally, the following content analysis includes all statements that were verbally 
delivered on the Senate floor. Often times, senators had various written materials (e.g., 
newspaper articles, journal articles, letters from outside groups endorsing or opposing a 
nominee, etc.) inserted into the Congressional Record. These items were not included in the 
content analysis unless a senator actually read them aloud on the Senate floor. In a few rare 
instances, senators delivered part of their statements verbally, but then had their fuller 
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written statements inserted into the Record (most often because of time constraints on their 
floor time). In the few cases where this happened, I used the senator’s longer written 
statement in lieu of their truncated floor speech.19 
The content analysis for each nomination was performed by me or by one of my two 
research assistants. To ensure for inter-coder reliability, approximately one-third of the 
statements were independently coded by two readers. The results were remarkably 
consistent. Overall, the percent agreement for all substantive statements approached 94%. 
Policy stance was the trickiest aspect to code, but even in this area the percent agreement 
hovered around 90% for all women’s issue statements.  
Since the goal of the following analysis is to compare the rate at which male and 
female senators address women’s issues in their floor speeches, the main dependent variable 
will be a percent measure. The denominator consists of all substantive policy words a 
senator spoke during the course of the confirmation, while the numerator includes the 
number of words that were dedicated to the identified women’s issues.    
I chose to focus on the rate of speech, as opposed to the actual quantity of words 
spoken, for several reasons. First, this decision builds on previous studies in this area (see 
Osborn and Mendez 2010 and Swers and Kim 2013). Second, the rate of speech offers a 
good indication of how a legislator chose to spend his or her floor time and therefore may 
be a better measure of legislative priorities. Absolute numbers, on the other hand, could be 
misleading. For example, two senators may talk about an issue for the same amount of time, 
but one senator may go on to talk more overall. Percent measures, therefore, get around this 
                                                 
19 To ensure this decision did not affect the results, the following analyses were tried with both the written and 
verbal statements. In the end, the results did not change according to which measure was used. First, only a 
handful of senators added fuller written statements to the Record (less than 1% of the overall statements that 
were analyzed). The vast majority of senators verbally delivered their entire statement on the Senate floor. 
Second, while the few written statements were longer, the following analyses primarily rely on a percent 
measure, so in the end the overall outcome was virtually identical.     
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problem and more accurately reflect a senator’s “strategic decision of how to allot time” 
(Osborn and Mendez 2010: 8).             
 
Analysis     
 The final dataset includes 271 individual floor statements and 544,715 total 
substantive words. As Figure 4.1 reveals, the number of substantive words that were spoken 
varied from confirmation to confirmation. Throughout the course of Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s confirmation proceedings in 1981, forty-nine senators spoke a total of 46,766 
substantive words. Flash-forward to Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation proceedings in 2009, 
and eighty-seven senators spoke 234,268 substantive words.20  
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Total Words Spoken for each Supreme Court Nominee 
 
                                                 
20 As displayed in Table 4.1, Sotomayor’s confirmation garnered a lot more attention than previous nominees, 
including Roberts’s confirmation a few years earlier. While it is not entirely clear why this was the case, it is 
expected that the hyper-partisan environment coupled with controversial remarks from the nominee’s past 
(such as Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” comment) motivated opposition senators to speak on the floor. The data 
provides some preliminary evidence for this, as thirty-four Republican senators accounted for over half of the 
words spoken about Sotomayor throughout her confirmation. These findings could also be reflecting what 
has been found at the lower court level, where female and minority nominees tend to face more scrutiny and a 
longer confirmation process in the Senate (Nixon and Gross 2001).    
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As displayed in Figure 4.2, the preliminary evidence also suggests that female 
senators spoke at roughly the rate we would expect given their presence in the Senate. In 
two nominations (Breyer’s and, to a much lesser extent, Sotomayor’s) women’s voices were 
noticeably muted. However, in the remaining three nominations female senators spoke 
roughly in proportion to their numbers, and actually spoke considerably more than their 
numbers would warrant throughout the course of Roberts’s confirmation proceedings.   
 
Figure 4.2: Female Senators’ Rate of Participation 
During Confirmation Floor Statements 
 
 
There were also noticeable differences in the amount of words that were dedicated 
to the identified women’s issues throughout the course of each confirmation. Figures 4.3-4.7 
display the percent of words that dealt with each coded issue-area for the five confirmations 
under investigation. Women’s issues were most prominent in Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
confirmation. Her confrimation had the highest total percent of floor statements that were 
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dedicated to women’s issue overall, as well as the highest percent of words dedicated to 
direct women’s issues. The greater importance of these issues during O’Connor’s 
nomination is not surprising given the historical signifigance of her being the first woman 
nominated to the Court. However, the magnitude of this distortion is still noteworthy—
while direct women’s issues accounted for around 3% of the total cases the Supreme Court 
heard in the decade preceding O’Connor’s nomination, over 30% of the floor statements 
made during her confirmation touched on these matters.21 
                                                 
21 I used the Supreme Court Database to calculate the number of Supreme Court cases that dealt with direct 
women’s issues (http://scdb.wustl.edu). I included all cases in their sex discrimination subcategories 
(employment and non-employment) and their abortion subcategory (which includes contraceptives) in my 
estimate of direct women’s issues cases.    
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Figure 4.3: Floor Statements during 




Figure 4.4: Floor Statements during 




Figure 4.5: Floor Statements during 
Breyer’s 1994 Confirmation by Subject 
Area 
 
Figure 4.6: Floor Statements during 




Figure 4.7: Floor Statements during 
Sotomayor’s 2009 Confirmation by 
Subject Area 
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 Many of the direct women’s issue statements during O’Connor’s confirmation dealt 
with diversity on the Court (or the historical lack thereof). In later nominations though, 
several other topics in this category were common talking points—most frequently 
statements dealing with abortion, contraceptives, and gender discrimination. Poverty law was 
the most common topic in the traditional women’s issue category, including statutory and 
constitutional protections for indigent individuals. Civil rights issues were a popular subject 
of conversation in several of the nominations under investigation. Topics such as affirmative 
action, voting rights, and rights of the disabled topped this category. Privacy issues tended to 
receive somewhat less attention than the other categories. When privacy matters were raised, 
they tended to be framed in broad discussions about a general right to privacy from 
inappropriate state action, although a few specific policy matters (such as homosexuality and 
the right to die) were included in these statements. 
The preliminary evidence also suggests that female senators were more likely to raise 
topics related to all four of these women’s issue categories during their floor statements. As 
displayed in Figure 4.8, in three out of the five nominations under consideration, female 
senators dedicated a higher percent of their floor statements to the identified women’s 
issues. Once again, the nominations of Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor stand out. In 
Sotomayor’s nomination, male and female senators spoke about women’s issues at almost 
the exact same rate. As previously noted, women hardly spoke at all during Breyer’s 
nomination and, when they did, none of their statements were about women’s issues. It is 
interesting to note that Sotomayor and Breyer are the two Democratic nominations in the 
study. It could be that female senators are more motivated to speak about women’s issues 
when they view a nominee as hostile to these matters. By contrast, when a nominee is 
viewed as a potential ally, silence may be a form of tacit approval. There is some anecdotal 
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evidence that this reasoning was at least partially at play during Sotomayor’s confirmation 
battle. When asked about why women’s groups (such as abortion rights advocates) were 
noticeably absent during the deliberations, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) remarked, 
“Things are going well. There’s no need to get involved” (qtd. in Bradley).  
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Figure 4.8: Proportion of Statements about Women’s Issues 
 
 
  There is even stronger evidence of gender differences when one looks at the types of 
women’s issue statements made by male and female senators. As Table 4.2 displays, women 
frequently made a disproportionate share of pro women’s issue comments, and a lower than 
proportionate share of con statements. In addition, these gender differences have become 
especially pronounced in the more recent nominations in the dataset. For example, during 
Roberts’s confirmation, women accounted for 14% of the Senate’s membership, yet they 
made 41% of the pro/direct women’s issues statements. Similarly, the seventeen female 
senators present during Sotomayor’s confirmation made 31% of the pro/direct women’s 
issue statements. Female senators also accounted for a disproportionate share of the pro 
statements in the tradition women’s and privacy issue categories during these two 
confirmations. Interestingly, these distortions were not present in the earlier three 
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nominations. These results therefore seem to correspond with the expectations of critical 
mass theorists. It appears as though female senators have started speaking more—and more 
favorably— about women’s issues as more women have entered the Senate.         
 
Table 4.2: Male and Female Senators’ Policy Stances on Women’s Issues 
 O’Connor Souter Breyer Roberts Sotomayor 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Percent of Senate 98% 2% 98% 2% 93% 7% 86% 14% 83% 17% 
Direct Women’s Issues: 
Pro 100% 0% 93% 7% 100% 0% 59% 41% 69% 31% 
Con 97% 3% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 99% 1% 
Neutral 95% 5% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 97% 3% 
Total 97% 3% 96% 4% 100% 0% 69% 31% 81% 19% 
Traditional Women’s Issues: 
Pro - - 55% 45% 100% 0% 69% 31% 42% 58% 
Con - - - - 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Neutral 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Total 100% 0% 81% 19% 100% 0% 81% 19% 53% 47% 
Civil Rights Issues: 
Pro 100% 0% 98% 2% 100% 0% 83% 17% 82% 18% 
Con 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 99% 1% 
Neutral 100% 0% 99% 1% 100% 0% 97% 3% 87% 13% 
Total 100% 0% 98% 2% 100% 0% 85% 15% 91% 9% 
Privacy Issues: 
Pro 100% 0% 92% 8% - - 53% 47% 75% 25% 
Con - - - - - - 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Neutral - - 100% 0% 100% 0% 81% 19% 100% 0% 








 The preliminary evidence seems to suggest that female senators are more vocal 
advocates of women’s issues during Supreme Court confirmations. However, a more 
rigorous empirical analysis is needed in order to control for potentially confounding factors. 
Before proceeding, it must first be recognized that the subject matter of interest (senators’ 
floor statements) presents somewhat of a statistical challenge. Because we can only analyze 
floor statements of senators who actually spoke, we are dealing with a type of censored data. 
In order to account for this selection bias, the following analysis will use a Heckman model. 
The outcome equation will attempt to explain the factors that affect the percent of a 
senator’s floor statements that pertain to women’s issues, while the selection part of the 
model will include factors that affect a senator’s likelihood of speaking on the floor in the 
first place. 
This earlier selection equation will contain a number of independent variables. First, 
a dummy variable indicating membership on the Senate Judiciary Committee will be 
included. Previous research has shown that members of relevant committees are more likely 
to engage in pertinent floor activities, including floor speeches (Hall 1996). Members of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee are likely to have more information about the nominee’s 
background and judicial philosophy, and therefore may be more likely to deliver a floor 
speech. In addition, members of the Committee may expect others in the chamber to look 
to them for talking points and cues on how to vote.  
 A control for party leadership will also be included. Since party leaders are, in a 
sense, spokespersons for their parties, they may be more likely to engage in visible floor 
activities (Maltzman and Singelman 1996). For each Senate in the analysis, the president pro 
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tempore as well as the majority and minority leaders and whips will be coded as party 
leaders.    
Electoral considerations may also affect a senator’s propensity to take to the floor. 
Due to the Senate’s staggered elections, only one-third of senators are up for reelection at a 
given time. If a senator’s term is ending in the next election cycle, she may be more 
interested in communicating with her constituents and therefore more likely to make a floor 
statement (Hill and Hurley 2002). For this reason, a dummy variable indicating reelection 
will be included in the selection equation.  
Other factors may potentially decrease the chances of a senator making a floor 
statement.  New senators, for example, may be disadvantaged in resources and within the 
internal institutional hierarchy (Hall 1996; Hill and Hurley 2002; Osborn and Mendez 2010). 
Such challenges may therefore make it harder for freshman senators to prepare and deliver 
floor speeches. As the previously reviewed literature suggests, female officeholders may also 
have a harder time getting their voices heard compared to their male colleagues (Kathlene 
1994; Mattei 1998).    
Gender is also the main independent variable in the outcome model. This time, 
however, gender is expected to have a positive impact on the rate at which senators address 
women’s issues in their floor speeches. The female variable is a dichotomous measure which 
is coded as 1 if the senator is a woman, 0 otherwise. The outcome model will also include a 
control for partisanship, coded as 1 if the senator is a Democrat. This control accounts for 
the fact that the pro women’s issues policy stances generally coincide with a more liberal 
ideology, which is more frequently associated with members of the Democratic Party.  
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Finally, as with the statistical model in Chapter Three, I will again cluster by nominee 
in order to account for the stacked nature of the dataset. The reported standard errors have 
therefore been adjusted to account for the five separate nominations under investigation. 
 
Table 4.3: Explaining the Percent of Senators’ Floor Statements 
That Deal with Women’s Issues 
Variable Model 1: All 
Women’s 
Issues 







































     

























































N 500 500 500 500 
Log Likelihood -1495.915 -1446.676 -1417.813 -1311.681 
Note: Cell entries are Heckman coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at the p.01 level; ** denotes significance at the p.05 level; *denotes significance at the 
p.10 level. Standard errors are clustered by nomination. 
 
Table 4.3 displays the results from four separate models. The dependent variable in 
Model 1 is the percent of senators’ floor statements that touched on any of the coded  
women’s issue-areas. The selection equation reveals that, as expected, members of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and party leaders are more likely to make floor statements during 
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confirmation proceedings.22 Contrary to expectations, the outcome equation in Model 1 
reveals that neither women nor Democrats are more likely to speak about women’s issues in 
their floor statements. While both of these measures are positive, neither one reaches a level 
of statistical significance.  
However, when policy stance is taken into consideration, the expected relationships 
are confirmed. Model 2 looks at the percent of senators’ floor statements that were 
pro/women’s issues. The same two variables remain significant in the selection equation, but 
this time both the female and Democrat variables are statistically significant and large 
enough to be quite substantively meaningful—Democrats dedicated ten percent more of 
their floor statements to pro women’s issue policy stances than Republicans, and female 
senators dedicated over seven percent more of their statements to these matters than men.    
 Similar findings are uncovered when we look just at statements dealing with direct 
women’s issues. As shown in Model 3, neither the female nor the Democrat variable was a 
significant predictor of how much a senator talked about direct women’s issues on the floor 
of the Senate. However, both of these variables are highly significant in Model 4, which 
looks at pro/direct women’s issue statements. Democrats, on average, dedicated four 
percent more of their floor statements to positive commentaries on these matters. The 
female variable yielded a slightly larger magnitude, with women in the Senate dedicating 4.5 
percent more to these matters than their male colleagues.       
Previous studies have found that male and female legislators talk about some 
women’s issues (such as abortion) at similar rates (Osborn and Mendez 2010; Swers and 
                                                 
22 It might also be expected that partisanship could affect senators’ floor participation. Majority party members, 
for example, might have institutional and political clout that could increase their likelihood of speaking on the 
Senate floor. To test this theory, a dummy variable indicating majority party membership was included in the 
selection model. The results were insignificant. Similarly, a dummy variable indicating membership in the 
president’s party was also not significant.     
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Kim 2013); however, the findings reported in this chapter take the analysis a step further and 
show that male and female senators articulate significantly different viewpoints on these 
matters. Even after controlling for partisan differences, female senators were significantly 
more likely to use their floor time to advocate for women’s issues and to raise concerns 
about how a potential Supreme Court justice might affect the progression of women’s rights. 
The data also seems to support my expectation that female senators would make the 
biggest difference in terms of direct women’s issues during confirmation proceedings. 
Additional models revealed that female senators did not dedicate more of their floor time to 
addressing or advocating for traditional women’s issues, civil rights issues, or privacy issues. 
These results therefore support the findings in the broader gender and politics literature that 
female officeholders make the biggest impact on issues that most directly relate to the lives 
of American women.   
The data also seem to support the earlier observation that female senators were most 
active on women’s issues during recent Republican nominations to the Court. While not 
displayed, when the analysis is broken down by each individual confirmation, the results 
show that female senators were most vocal about women’s issues during the confirmation 
proceedings for Justices David Souter and John Roberts.23 This again suggests that female 
senators may be more active on women’s issues when they believe they are in a defensive 
position. Table 4.4 therefore reruns the models from Table 4.3, but includes an interaction 
term between female senators and Republican nominations to the Court. The results show 
that female senators are much more concerned about women’s issues when faced with a 
                                                 
23 Models 2 and 4 were run for each individual nomination. The female variable in the outcome model was 
positive and significant at the .05 level in both models for the Roberts confirmation. The variable was also 
significant at the .10 level in Model 4 for the Souter confirmation. Model 2 was unable to run for the 
Sotomayor confirmation. The female variable was insignificant in all of the remaining models.    
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Republican nominee, as the female/Republican nominee interaction term is large and 
statistically significant in all four models. These findings suggest that the impact of female 
senators during the confirmation process may be contingent upon partisan considerations.24   
 
Table 4.4: Female Senators During Republican Nominations to the Court 
Variable Model 1: All 
Women’s 
Issues 



















































     

























































N 500 500 500 500 
Log Likelihood -1493.663 -1443.937 -1416.268 -1309.88 
Note: Cell entries are Heckman coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at the p.01 level; ** denotes significance at the p.05 level; *denotes significance at the 
p.10 level. Standard errors are clustered by nomination. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Once again, neither the female variable nor the female/Republican nominee interaction term were significant 
when looking at civil rights or privacy issues. 
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What Women Had to Say   
The evidence suggests that female senators did make a difference in the confirmation 
proceedings under investigation. While all senators were talking about women’s issues in 
their floor statements, female senators were saying substantively different things. Specifically, 
women were more likely to speak positively about women’s issues, praising the existing 
protections in these areas and calling for greater equality in the future.      
On several occasions, female senators unequivocally spoke as women and even 
expressed a duty to work on behalf of all females in America. As Senator Barbara Boxer (D-
CA) stated during John Roberts’s confirmation:  
The role of the women senators is very important. Women across America are 
counting on us to stand up, to ask questions, and to get the answers. When we vote 
on this nomination, it must be an informed vote either yes because we believe he will 
protect our rights and freedoms or no because we have not been convinced. 
(Congressional Record, September 12, 2005: S9910)   
 
Throughout the course of the Roberts confirmation, a number of female Democratic 
senators even joined together and created a website for the public to have input in the 
confirmation proceedings. While the purpose of the site was to allow any concerned citizen 
to submit questions about the nominee, the female senators framed their intentions in a 
broader historical narrative about inclusion and access. As Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) 
explained:       
 
Before the Senate left for its August break, I joined with six of my Democratic 
women colleagues to launch a website allowing Americans to have a voice in the 
confirmation process. The American people have a right to be part of the process 
and let the Senate know what they want Judge Roberts to answer. And we want them 
at the table. We want them to feel included and have the chance to participate. The 
Democratic women launched a Web site to allow them that opportunity. We 
remember how we were shut out during the judicial proceedings on Clarence 
Thomas. There were no women on the Judiciary Committee. Now there are. But we 
know what it is like not to have a seat at the table. We know what it is like not to be 
able to raise our questions. (Congressional Record, September 12, 2005: S9908) 
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Senator Mikulski expressed similar sentiments during Souter’s confirmation several 
years earlier. In this confirmation, Mikulski highlighted the nominee’s evasiveness on 
women’s issues, noting: 
 
I have no doubt that Judge Souter is professionally competent. Nor do I question his 
personal integrity. But I cannot cast my vote to confirm a man who has been silent, 
vague, or evasive every time he has been asked if he would uphold fundamental 
constitutional rights—rights of concern to every American and particularly of 
concern to America’s women…Mr. President, women were not even allowed to vote 
in this country until 1920. Only 16 women have ever stood on the floor of this 
Chamber as a U.S. Senator. Only in the last generation have many women truly 
started to gain control over their lives, their careers, and their families. And we still 
have far to go. We have worked too hard and come too far to accept silence and 
evasion from a Supreme Court nominee. (Congressional Record, October 2, 1990: 
S14363)  
 
In addition to providing evidence of a female senator acting as a surrogate for a 
larger constituency of women, Senator Mikulski’s statement is also potentially informative in 
regard to the findings in Chapter Three. The statistical findings there suggest that female 
senators weigh nominees’ judicial philosophy more heavily than male senators. This 
ideological primacy is noted in the first sentences of Mikulski’s statement, and is explained as 
being rooted in her deep concern over the future of women’s rights in America.   
   
Conclusion 
The content analysis in this chapter—which includes floor statements made during 
five Supreme Court confirmations spanning the course of three decades—provides support 
for the assertion that female senators actively work as advocates for women’s issues during 
the confirmation process. Taken as a whole, the evidence in this chapter suggests that female 
senators do make a difference when it comes to floor consideration of Supreme Court 
nominees. Women’s issues are a popular talking point during confirmation proceedings, and 
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no one group has a monopoly on these topics. However, upon further investigation it 
becomes clear that female senators are adding a unique perspective to these conversations. 
Female senators dedicated more of their floor time to articulating pro policy positions on 
issues that affect the lives of American women, particularly when faced with a Republican 
nominee. In many instances, these statements involved female senators speaking first and 
foremost as women, and on behalf of a larger women’s constituency.  
These findings offer insight into the levels of intensity that male and female senators 
have regarding women’s issues, and may even help better explain the voting differences 
uncovered in Chapter Three. Chapter Five—the final empirical chapter of this work—will 
continue along these lines by exploring potential gender differences within the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.  
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CHAPTER 5
Inside the Senate Judiciary Committee 
 
During the fallout from the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill controversy, the National 
Women’s Political Caucus took out a full-page advertisement in the New York Times posing 
one simple question: “What if fourteen women, instead of fourteen men, had sat on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee during the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings?” (Burrell 
1994, qtd. in Swers 2002: 89). The advertisement was expressing a common belief at that 
time—that the lack of women on the Senate Judiciary Committee compromised its ability to 
consider the proposed allegations of sexual harassment. The underlying assumption was that 
the lack of women’s descriptive representation during the confirmation hearings must have 
meant that women’s substantive interests were not represented. In an effort to do damage 
control in the aftermath of the controversy, some members of the Senate scrambled to 
address this glaring gender imbalance. Then chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-DE), allegedly proclaimed, “Come hell or high water, there will be women 
on that committee,” and he ultimately succeeded in convincing party leadership to take the 
unusual step of increasing the size of the committee in order to accommodate new female 
members (Arnold and King 2002: 286).  
In the following 103rd Congress, female senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Carol 
Moseley-Braun (D-IL) both joined the Judiciary Committee, and since that time the 
committee has consistently had at least one female member. While women’s descriptive 
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representation on the committee has clearly increased, little empirical work has asked if 
gender diversity on the committee actually affects the representation of women’s substantive 
group interests. This chapter will explore this question by looking inside the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. The analysis will be structured as a case study that examines male and female 
senators’ actions during the confirmation hearing for Chief Justice John Roberts. I will then 
compare these deliberations to the floor consideration of the nominee to see if discussions 
of women’s issues systematically vary between these two stages of the confirmation process. 
The results suggest that female senators do act as champions of women’s issues during 
confirmation hearings, and that the scarcity of women on the Senate Judiciary Committee 
may influence how women’s issues are discussed throughout committee deliberations.         
 
The Importance of Committees 
Committees have long been recognized as a central feature of the policy-making 
process within the United States Congress. The committee system creates a division of labor 
that allows individual members to develop policy expertise in a given area, work for targeted 
benefits for his or her constituents, and ultimately claim credit for beneficial policy actions 
within the committee’s jurisdiction—all activities that aid a member of Congress’s electoral 
aspirations (Mayhew 1974). Committee members are also given an insider’s advantage when 
it comes time to legislating on an issue within their committee’s domain. Membership on a 
relevant committee gives members of Congress certain informational advantages and 
institutional resources, benefits that lower the cost of entry that officeholders must pay when 
they decide to take an active role in a particular legislative matter (Hall 1996). Furthermore, 
not only do committee members have advantages during the early phases of the policy-
96 
making process, they are also more likely to have the last say in policy deliberations through 
their involvement at the conference stage (Shepsle and Weingast 1987).        
 
Women in the Committee System 
While the committee system is a fundamental building block of the legislative 
process, relatively few studies have looked at the behavior or potential influence of female 
officeholders at this stage of policy development. Studies have found that women bring a 
different social dynamic to the committee process and exhibit less aggressive speech patterns 
during committee deliberations. Kathlene (1994), for example, found that female committee 
chairs spoke fewer words, took fewer turns, and made fewer interruptions than their male 
counterparts. Similarly, Rosenthal (1998) surveyed committee chairs from all fifty state 
legislatures and found that female chairs saw themselves as more affectionate and team-
oriented leaders. Female committee chairs were also more people-oriented, and were more 
likely to be motivated by integrative leadership approaches, such as coalition building and 
bringing people together.    
Another line of research has focused on the importance of gender during the 
committee assignment process. Studies in this area have found that female House members 
are not at a disadvantage when it comes to attaining valuable committee portfolios 
(Friedman 1996). In fact, some studies have even found evidence that women in the House 
of Representatives actually have more success at attaining prestigious committee assignments 
than their male counterparts (Gertzog 1995). By contrast, studies in the U.S. Senate have 
found that female members of that chamber are not the beneficiaries of better-than-average 
committee portfolios (Arnold and King 2002). Beyond a few rare instances where female 
senators were successful at quickly navigating the institutional hierarchy (such as the historic 
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class of 1992), generally male and female senators appear to be on equal footing when it 
comes to securing highly coveted committee positions.    
However, the abovementioned studies looked at the overall prestige of committee 
portfolios (usually by relying on Stewart and Groseclose’s Committee Power Index). In a 
2003 article, Frisch and Kelly used an alternative approach and compared House members’ 
committee requests to their final committee assignments. This technique allowed the authors 
to consider individual representative’s personal preferences. Unlike the previous studies, here 
it was found that congresswomen of both parties were at a disadvantage in attaining their 
preferred committee assignments. These gender differences were particularly prevalent 
between male and female Republican House members.25  
Findings are also mixed over whether or not female officeholders seek out 
committee positions that better enable them to work on women’s policy matters. Studies at 
the state level have found that women gravitate toward committees with jurisdiction over 
women’s issues, and congresswomen appeared eager to take on these same representational 
duties at the national level (Thomas 1994; Carroll 2002).  However, Frisch and Kelly’s (2003) 
study found that congresswomen were not more likely to request seats on women’s issue 
committees, and others have found that congresswomen have diverse committee portfolios 
that span a variety of policy domains (Arnold and King 2002).   
  
                                                 
25 Interestingly, Frisch and Kelly attribute the relative success of Democratic congresswomen to the presence 
of female members on the party’s Committee-on-Committees, access that their counterparts in the Republican 
Party were denied. Such evidence bolsters arguments about the importance of women’s descriptive 
representation within institutional positions of power.   
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The Legislative Effect of Women in Committees  
No matter how they get their seats, research has shown that committee assignments 
are crucial to female legislators’ ability to substantively represent women’s interests. By being 
placed on relevant committees, female legislators gain the institutional power and access to 
affect legislation in these areas. Studies at the state level have found that officeholders with 
seats on relevant committees are significantly more likely to introduce bills aimed at bettering 
the welfare of women and minorities (Bratton and Haynie 1999). Similarly, other studies 
have also found that female state representatives use their committee power to block bills 
that are viewed as hostile to women’s interests, such as legislation aimed at restricting 
abortion rights (Berkman and O’Connor 1993).  
Similar patterns have been found at the national level. In her study of the 103rd and 
104th Congresses, Swers found that female members of Congress were more likely than male 
members to use their committee positions to advocate for women’s interests, specifically by 
offering pro-feminist amendments during committee markups and floor debates (2002).  
In her 2002 study, Norton showed that congresswomen’s presence on committees 
and subcommittees with jurisdiction over reproductive and welfare reform policies (such as 
the Appropriations, Commerce, Judiciary, and Education and the Work Force Committees) 
greatly increased after the 103rd Congress. Importantly, as women’s descriptive 
representation on these committees increased, so too did the substantive representation of 
women’s interests. Norton’s study further revealed that congresswomen have been 
particularly successful at gaining and using seats on pertinent conference committees to steer 
the direction of reproductive policies. Between the 90th and 102nd Congresses, women sat on 
only 5.5% of conference committees dealing with reproductive policy matters. However, 
between the 103rd and 105th Congresses, this number jumped to 83.7%. This increased 
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presence allowed women to have a say later in the policy-making process, and greatly 
enhanced their ability to impact final policy outcomes. As Norton explained:  
 
When women held two or fewer seats on the conference committee, the position 
supported by committee women was likely to fail. Sixty-one percent of the 
conferences with two or fewer women could be counted as reproductive policy 
failures for women committee members. On the other hand, when women held 
three or more seats, on the conference committee, 72 percent could be counted as 
partial or complete success for committee women. (333) 
   
The Senate Judiciary Committee 
Such findings extend the purported connection between the descriptive and 
substantive representation of women to the committee level. If this relationship holds true, 
then a cursory glance at the Senate Judiciary Committee’s membership may be a cause of 
concern. As shown in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, only six women have ever served on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, and women’s representation on the Committee has frequently 
lagged behind the proportion of women in the Senate. The first female committee member, 
Maryon Pittman Allen, was appointed to the Senate following the death of her husband in 
1978 and served in the institution for only five months. Consistent female membership on 
the Committee only came in the aftermath of the Clarence Thomas controversy. The newest 
female senator on the Committee, Mazie Horono (D-HI), took her seat at the beginning of 
the 113th Congress. Her addition brings the total number of female senators currently 
serving on the Committee up to three (accounting for almost 17% of the Committee’s 





Table 5.1: Female Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Senator Party Affiliation Congress of Committee 
Membership 
Maryon Pittman Allen Democrat 95th 
Dianne Feinstein Democrat 103rd-113th 
Carol Moseley-Braun Democrat 103rd 
Maria Cantwell Democrat 107th 
Amy Klobuchar Democrat 111th-113th 
Mazie Horono Democrat 113th 
Note: Information for this table was collected by perusing the Senate Judiciary Committee’s 




Figure 5.1: Percent of Women on the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
90th Congress-113th Congress 
 
The scarce representation of women on the Senate Judiciary Committee is 
particularly troublesome considering the important place this committee holds in the 
American system of checks and balances. In addition to its regular committee functions, the 
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Senate Judiciary Committee also has the significant task of evaluating Supreme Court 
nominees. The committee does not usually exercise a gatekeeper function in this area (it 
almost always reports Supreme Court nominees to the full Senate); however, only two 
nominees have ever gone on to gain Senate confirmation after receiving an unfavorable 
recommendation from the committee(Rutkus and Bearden 2006).26  
In their efforts to evaluate potential Supreme Court justices, the committee holds 
public confirmation hearings, during which it receives testimonies from the nominees. While 
this was not always part of the confirmation process, every nominee since John Harlan in 
1955 has appeared before the committee (History of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary). 
Today, Supreme Court confirmation hearings have become high-profile political events, yet 
relatively little academic attention has been devoted to exploring what actually happens in 
them. In their 1994 study, Guliuzza, Reagan, and Barrett conducted a content analysis of 
twenty-three Supreme Court confirmation hearings to examine the types of questions and 
commentaries senators made during committee deliberations. Their results revealed that 
constitutional matters (as opposed to questions about the nominee’s character or 
competency) clearly dominated confirmation hearings. Somewhat surprisingly, the authors 
also found that this emphasis on constitutional matters was not unique to the post-Bork era. 
While Bork did receive a high level of constitutional questions (around 93% of all of the 
questions he received dealt with such matters), many other nominees—both before and after 
his nomination—had similar confirmation proceedings. 
  Ringhand and Collins (2010) also found that Bork’s confirmation hearing was not 
all that different from others. In this study, the authors developed a new database that 
examined statements made during every Supreme Court confirmation hearing where a 
                                                 
26 The two nominees were Stanley Matthews in 1881 and Lucius Lamar in 1888. 
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nominee was present since 1939.27 Their results revealed that questions about a nominee’s 
judicial philosophy typically account for 10-20% of all comments, and Bork’s confirmation 
hearing fell within this normal range. The authors also found that, starting in the 1970s, civil 
rights issues have overwhelmingly been the dominant issue in these proceedings.28 Since this 
time, matters related to civil rights accounted for at least one out of every five questions a 
nominee received (18). Within this category, questions dealing with racial discrimination 
have been the most prolific, accounting for almost a quarter of all civil rights comments. 
However, there is evidence that other issues are moving into the spotlight. Starting in the 
1980s, the predominance of comments dealing with racial discrimination started to decline, 
while comments about discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation have 
been steadily increasing.   
Ringhand and Collins also considered whether or not the identity of a nominee 
affected confirmation hearings. Here, the authors presented significant evidence that female 
and minority Supreme Court nominees face substantively different confirmation proceedings 
than their white male counterparts. For example, senators engaged minority and female 
nominees with less “chatter” during their hearings (i.e., non-substantive verbal interactions). 
Senators also asked these nominees fewer questions about government operations, but 
significantly more questions about their personal judicial philosophies.  
This chapter will further explore confirmation hearings through a gendered lens by 
comparing the actions of male and female senators. It is again expected that female senators 
                                                 
27 In 1925, Harlan Stone appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee to answer questions about his role in 
the Teapot Dome scandal. This was the first time a Supreme Court nominee was called to testify before the 
Committee. However, such testimonies did not become common practice until the mid-1950s, starting with 
President Eisenhower’s nomination of John Harlan. (History of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary).   
28 The authors based their coding on the Policy Agendas Project. As such, their civil rights category 
encompasses several sub-issues, including: abortion rights; freedom of speech and religion; voting rights; the 
right to privacy (non-abortion); and discrimination on the basis of race, age, physical ability, gender, and 
sexual orientation.     
103 
will act as advocates for women’s substantive group representation. In addition, women’s 
historical underrepresentation on the Senate Judiciary Committee is expected to have 
consequences in terms of how women’s issues are handled during this stage of deliberations. 
First, given the salience of women’s issues in the overarching political landscape, I expect 
that senators will devote proportionally more time to these matters in committee than they 
did during floor statements. Committee deliberations are the first examination of a nominee 
and, in a sense, are the nation’s introduction to a potential Supreme Court justice. As such, I 
expect that committee members will use this opportunity to press the nominee on high-
profile political issues that garner national interest, including women’s issues. Second, as the 
results in Chapter Four revealed, male and female senators talked about direct women’s 
issues at about the same rate during their floor statements, but women were systematically 
more likely to express support for these matters. Due to the low number of women on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, I expect the conversations about direct women’s issues at this 
stage to be more negative in tone than they were during floor debates.    
Hypothesis 1: Women’s issues will receive proportionally more attention 
during committee hearings than they did during floor statements. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Direct women’s issue statements will be more negative in tone 
during the committee stage. 
 
Data and Methods 
Unlike the previous studies in this area which looked at multiple hearings over time, 
this analysis will be structured as a case study that compares what happens in the 
confirmation hearing to what happens during floor consideration of a nominee. This 
approach will therefore highlight any potential differences in these two important steps of 
the confirmation process.  
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As such, the following analysis will focus on one nomination in depth—that of Chief 
Justice John Roberts. The Roberts nomination was chosen because it offers valuable 
analytical leverage with respect to women’s interests during the confirmation process. First, 
Roberts’s confirmation was the first one in history with a significant presence of female 
senators (Swers and Kim 2013). With fourteen women serving the Senate, Roberts’s 
nomination had double the number of female senators that were present during the 
preceding confirmation of Justice Stephen Breyer. Roberts’s nomination was also a 
historically significant one for American women. President Bush originally nominated 
Roberts to replace the first female member of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. 
Roberts’s nomination therefore stood to decrease the gender balance on the Court. 
O’Connor herself lamented this loss of women’s representation on the bench when she 
remarked that Roberts was “good in every way, except he is not a woman” (Bumiller 2005). 
However, Roberts’s confirmation took an unexpected turn after the death of William 
Rehnquist, at which point President Bush withdrew Roberts’s nomination and then re-
nominated him for the vacated chief justice position. Therefore, by the time the Senate 
hearings began, the stakes in this confirmation were particularly high. In addition, many 
women’s rights activists were concerned with the possibility of Roberts being placed into 
such a powerful position on the Court, as evidence in his background suggested that he was 
opposed, and even at times openly hostile, toward abortion rights and the enforcement of 
anti-discrimination laws (Swers 2009).  
An in-depth analysis of Roberts’s confirmation will therefore allow me to discern if 
and when women’s rights advocates were able to voice their concerns during the 
confirmation proceedings. The comparison of the confirmation hearing to the floor 
consideration by the entire chamber will also juxtapose two settings in which women had 
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noticeably different levels of descriptive representation. Of the fourteen women in the 
Senate at that time, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) was the only one on the Judiciary 
Committee, putting women’s representation on the committee at around 5.5%. 
The following analysis includes all verbal statements senators made during the 
confirmation hearing. This includes each senator’s opening remarks, as well as statements 
made during both rounds of questioning of the nominee. To conduct the content analysis, I 
employed the same coding rubric described in the previous chapter. This research design 
therefore offers some natural controls—the same nominee, the same coding rubric, and 
nearly identical partisan breakdowns—which aid in the comparison between the hearing and 
floor stages of the confirmation process.   
 
Women’s Issues During Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing versus Floor Statements 
As displayed in Table 5.2, more substantive words were spoken about John Roberts 
during his confirmation hearing than during floor consideration of the nominee (117,603 
substantive words in committee compared to 102,355 substantive words on the floor). These 
results reflect the overall importance of the committee hearings and the vital role that 
committee members play during the confirmation deliberations.  
As expected, the results also reveal that women’s issues garnered more attention 
during Roberts’s confirmation hearing than they did during the floor debates. Every coded 
issue category was discussed at a higher rate during this earlier stage of the confirmation 
process. The biggest difference was with direct women’s issue statements, which accounted 
for 8.4% of all substantive floor statements but 12.2% of all substantive words during the 
hearing. Traditional women’s issues also received noticeably more attention in committee 
than on the floor, 4.8% of substantive statements compared to 1.1%. The other two issue 
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categories were also discussed more in committee, although at rates closer to their floor 
proportions (15% compared to 13% for civil rights issues and 3.7% compared to 3% for 
privacy issues).   
 
Table 5.2: Percent of Substantive Words Dealing with Women’s Issues During 
Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing versus Floor Statements 
 Confirmation Hearing 
Total Substantive Words: 
117, 603 
Floor Statements 
Total Substantive Words: 
102,355 
Direct Women’s Issues:   
Pro 7.9% 6.2% 
Con 3.1% 0.6% 
Neutral 1.2% 1.5% 
Total 12.2% 8.4% 
Traditional Women’s Issues:   
Pro 4.4% 0.7% 
Con 0.1% 0.1% 
Neutral 0.2% 0.4% 
Total 4.8% 1.1% 
Civil Rights Issues:   
Pro 11.6% 11.0% 
Con 1.7% 0.1% 
Neutral 1.7% 1.9% 
Total 15.0% 13.0% 
Privacy Issues:   
Pro 2.5% 2.7% 
Con 0.2% 0.1% 
Neutral 1.0% 0.2% 
Total 3.7% 3.0% 
Note: All differences are significant at the .01 or .05 level under a two-sample test of proportions. 
 
These findings therefore provide support for hypothesis 1. Again, I anticipated these 
results due to the high-profile nature of many specific women’s issues. Confirmation 
hearings are highly watched political events, thereby giving committee members an ideal 
platform from which to tackle prominent national issues. There is some evidence that this 
logic was at play during Roberts’s confirmation hearing. For instance, Senator Arlen Specter 
(R-PA), then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, kicked off the first round of 
questioning of the nominee by stating:  
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Judge Roberts, there are many subjects of enormous importance that you will be 
asked about in this confirmation hearing, but I start with the central issue which 
perhaps concerns most Americans, and that is the issue of a woman’s right to choose 
and Roe v. Wade. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts: 141)    
 
As displayed in Table 5.3, many senators on the Committee followed suit and 
touched on women’s issues during the confirmation hearings. The most popular issue areas 
were civil rights and direct women’s issues. In fact, nearly every committee member spoke 
about these two issues at some point throughout the deliberations (with the exception of 
Chuck Grassley (R-IA) who did not speak about direct women’s issues and Russ Feingold 
(D-WI) who did not speak about civil rights).  
There are also some interesting partisan differences that emerged. As shown in Table 
5.3, every committee member spoke during the confirmation hearings. However, only 
slightly over half of those senators also spoke on the floor of the Senate. Republican 
committee members were much more likely to deliver a floor statement about John Roberts 
than were Democratic committee members, most likely due to partisan pressures to support 
and advocate for the president’s nominee. It also appears that the increased attention 
women’s issues received in committee was largely a result of Republican committee 
members’ statements. As shown in Table 5.4, members of both parties talked about 
women’s issues at a higher rate in committee than on the floor, but these differences were 
much larger for Republican senators. For example, Republicans devoted 6.2% of their 
substantive floor statements to direct women’s issues, but nearly double that (11.9%) during 
committee deliberations. Again, I expect these differences are the result of the high-profile 
nature of many specific women’s issues coupled with strong partisan pressures to defend the 
nominee on these grounds.     
  
 







































Biden (D) 43.8% -- 12.0% -- 4.0% -- 33.1% -- 
Brownback (R) 22.0% 7.4% 2.5% 0.0% 17.7% 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 
Coburn (R) 8.5% -- 0.0% --- 1.9% -- 0.0% -- 
Cornyn (R) 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 5.2% 0.0% 
Dewine (R) 0.9% 8.9 1.1% 0.0 11.8% 1.5 0.0% 0.0 
Durbin (D) 3.9% 0.0 12.1% 9.4 19.0% 34.4 1.3% 6.0 
Feingold (D) 9.1% -- 0.0% -- 0.0% -- 17.3% -- 
Feinstein (D) 49.3% -- 21.1% -- 21.3% -- 12.9% -- 
Graham (R) 12.6% -- 0.9% -- 11.8% -- 0.0% -- 
Grassley (R) 0.0% -- 0.0% -- 11.1% -- 0.0% -- 
Hatch (R) 9.6% 2.1% 3.3% 0.0% 9.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Kennedy (D) 10.3% 12.3% 4.8% 1.6% 92.3% 56.9 0.9% 0.0% 
Kohl (D) 10.4% -- 6.1% -- 7.4% -- 1.7% -- 
Kyl (R) 2.1% 1.9% 5.5% 0.0% 0.2% 0.8% 2.2% 0.0% 
Leahy (D) 11.6% 5.1% 6.1% 9.8% 5.8% 4.0% 1.5% 2.6% 
Schumer (D) 10.7% -- 0.0% -- 12.4% -- 12.5% -- 
Sessions (R) 14.7% 0.8% 1.7% 0.0% 14.9% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 
Specter (R) 25.8% 16.8% 0.0% 0.0% 9.4% 19.4% 2.1% 2.0% 
Note: Cell entries display the percent of a senator’s substantive statements that were devoted to each issue-category. Totals for some senators 







Table 5.4: Percent of Substantive Statements Devoted to Women’s Issues  











Committee     
% of Democratic 
Substantive Statements 
12.5% 7.5% 19.8% 5.5% 
% of Republican 
Substantive Statements 
11.9% 1.8% 10.0% 1.8% 
Floor     
% of Democratic 
Substantive Statements 
10.8% 2.3% 20.8% 5.1% 
% of Republican 
Substantive Statements 
6.2% 0% 5.8% 1.1% 
 
The findings also offer some (albeit more modest) evidence to support hypothesis 2. 
In addition to looking at the rate at which women’s issues were addressed, Table 5.2 also 
shows information about the tone of these statements. As expected, the conversation about 
direct women’s issues was significantly different in the committee setting, with a higher 
proportion of con statements directed towards these matters. During floor consideration of 
Roberts, con statements regarding direct women’s issues were only 0.6% of the substantive 
comments; yet, these statements accounted for over 3% of the substantive comments during 
the committee phase. However, some caveats are in order. First, given the limited scope of 
the data and research design, it is impossible to tell if these findings are simply the result of 
the increased attention Republicans gave these issues during the committee phase, or if an 
increased women’s presence on the committee would have affected these trends. In addition, 
at 3%, con/direct women’s issues were still a small portion of the overall substantive 
remarks, and pro/direct women’s issues were also more common in the committee hearings 
than they were during floor statements.  
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Like in the floor setting, many of the direct women’s issue statements in committee 
dealt with abortion and reproductive policy matters. The 1994 Violence Against Women 
Act, and the following U.S. v. Morrison case, were also common talking points. Several 
senators also used this opportunity to investigate evidence from Roberts’s past to glean some 
insight into his views on various women’s issues. Senators on the Democratic side of the 
aisle generally used this evidence to portray Roberts as a right-wing ideologue who was 
hostile towards women’s rights. For example, Democratic senators frequently cited memos 
that Roberts authored during his time in the Reagan administration, in which he seemingly 
called for less federal protection in the area of gender discrimination. As Senator Ted 
Kennedy (D-MA) explained:  
 
In 1981, you supported an effort by the Department of Education to reverse 17 
years of civil rights protections at colleges and universities that received Federal 
funds…As a result, more colleges and universities would legally be able to 
discriminate against people of color, women, and the disabled…You vehemently 
opposed the Civil Rights Restoration Act. Even after the Grove City Court found 
otherwise, you still believed that there was—and this is your quote—“a good deal of 
intuitive appeal to the argument that Federal loans and grants to students should not 
be viewed as Federal financial assistance to the university”…Judge Roberts, if you 
position prevailed, it would have been legal in many cases to discriminate in athletics 
for girls, women. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts: 174)    
 
Another cause of concern for Democratic senators was a legal brief Roberts had 
written over a decade earlier, in which he articulated a conservative interpretation of Title IX 
protections. The brief was about the landmark case Franklin v. Gwinnett County. In this case, 
Franklin, a female high school student, attempted to use Title IX to seek monetary damages 
against her school district after allegedly being subjected to repeated sexual harassment and 
abuse by one of her teachers. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) questioned Roberts about this 
case early in the first round of questioning: 
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Your brief that you wrote in 1991, when you were Kenneth Starr’s political deputy. 
This was in Franklin v. Gwinnett Public Schools. Now, in that case, a girl, Christine 
Franklin, had been sexually harassed. She had been abused from the time she was in 
the 10th grade by a teacher and a sports coach. The school was aware of the sexual 
harassment but took no action, in fact they even encouraged her not to complain. 
The Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Education investigated and found 
her rights were violated under title IX of our civil rights law; she had been physically 
abused; her right to complain about gender discrimination had been interfered with. 
You argued that she had no right to damages for this abuse. Now, your view was 
rejected by the Supreme Court…So do you now personally agree with and accept as 
binding law the reasoning of Justice White’s opinion in Franklin? (Confirmation Hearing 
on the Nomination of John G. Roberts: 156)     
 
Republican senators attempted to rebut such criticisms by arguing that Roberts’s 
views were not outside of the conservative mainstream. This strategy was employed by 
Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) in his discussion of the Franklin case. While the U.S. Supreme 
Court ultimately sided with Franklin and agreed that Title IX did allow for the award of 
monetary damages, Senator Sessions highlighted how this decision was not in line with the 
interpretation of the lower federal courts:   
 
Senator Sessions: On the Gwinnett case, the Title IX, the women’s education case, 
the position you took that would deny the right to sue a State entity, a government 
entity for money damages, was that not a position consistent with the position of the 
court of appeals that had written the only opinion on that subject?  
Judge Roberts: Yes, that was the court of appeals position.  
Senator Sessions: So you, in advocating that position, were expressing a view that 
was the view of the highest Federal court in the land at time?  
Judge Roberts: Yes. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts: 230) 
 
Sessions used this same strategy later in his statement, when he responded to 
Democrats’ concerns over gender discrimination in the workplace and the related issues of 
pay equity and comparable worth. Again, the goal seemed to be to deflect criticisms by 
painting Democrats as liberal extremists, and thereby depicting Roberts as a moderate voice 
of reason on issues of women’s rights.     
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Senator Sessions: With regard to the question of comparable work, I think Senator 
Feinstein was clear about this, but I would like to make it a little bit clearer. You have 
consistently favored equal pay for equal work, have you not, and did not President 
Reagan also favor that explicitly and openly?  
Judge Roberts: Absolutely.  
Senator Sessions: It is the question of this comparable worth theory that apparently 
one district court found in favor of, but that every circuit court and every other court 
that considered it, rejected it, that said that some body, some commission, I guess, 
would decide whether a secretary should be paid as much as a truck driver and make 
those kind of value judgment decisions. Is that not the difference between those two 
theories?  
Judge Roberts: That’s right. Yeah, there is no question of equal pay for equal work. 
It’s the idea that someone should decide that different jobs are of comparable worth 
and that therefore they should be paid the same. And the district court adopted that 
approach, was reversed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion by then-
Judge Anthony Kennedy.  
Senator Sessions: That is right. I know he did right on that, and I think that the 
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Ninth Circuits all rejected that idea, and frankly, it has not 
been heard from since. I am glad that you and President Reagan did not agree to that 
at the time. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts: 232) 
 
The Impact of Dianne Feinstein  
Women’s issues therefore received a substantial amount of discussion throughout 
the course of Roberts’s confirmation hearing; however, only one woman was actually 
present on the Senate Judiciary Committee to participate in the deliberations—Senator 
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). While Feinstein did not speak on the floor of the Senate at all 
about Roberts’s nomination, she was an active participant during his confirmation hearing, 
particularly when it came to issues affecting the well-being of women. As Table 5.3 reveals, 
Feinstein devoted proportionally more of her statements to direct and traditional women’s 
issues than any other senator on the committee. Direct women’s issues alone accounted for 
almost half of Feinstein’s substantive remarks, and the other issue categories were also 
frequently mentioned during her statements (21.1% for traditional women’s issues, 21.3% 
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for civil rights, and 12.9% for privacy issues).29 All of her comments on these matters were 
either positive or neutral in tone, and she alone accounted for nearly 24% of all of the 
positive statements about direct women’s issues during this stage of the confirmation 
process. 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 visually display the difference between Feinstein’s remarks and 
those of her male colleagues on the Judiciary Committee. These “word clouds” are based on 
senators’ opening statements for the confirmation hearing and depict the frequency of words 
by their size in the image (with more common words appearing larger).30 Figure 5.2 includes 
opening statements for all senators on the committee minus Feinstein, while Figure 5.3 only 
includes Feinstein’s opening remarks.   
  
                                                 
29 The categories total over 100% because many of her statements were coded for multiple issues.  
30 These images were created by using Wordle (http://www.wordle.net/). When creating the images, I had the 
program remove common English words, such as “a”, “an”, and “the.”   
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As the figures show, the opening statements by the male committee members were 
not overwhelmingly dominated by a theme of women’s issues. While the image includes 
several words we would expect to hear during a confirmation hearing (e.g., “Supreme”, 
“Court”, “Constitution”, “judge”, etc.) the words do not suggest a particular emphasis on 
the topics under investigation in this analysis. On the other hand, Feinstein’s image 
prominently displays several words that fall into the coded issue categories. For example, the 
large appearance of words like “women”, “woman”, and “abortion” suggest frequent 
commentary on direct women’s issues, while words like “family” and “school” indicate 
statements regarding traditional women’s issues.  
There is also evidence that Feinstein felt a distinct obligation to represent women’s 
interests throughout the course of the hearing. As she clearly articulated halfway through her 
opening statement, 
 
Now, as the only woman on this Committee, I believe I have an additional role in 
evaluating nominees for the Supreme Court, and that is to see if the hard-earned 
autonomy of women is protected. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts: 28)  
 
Feinstein then went on to recall the history of gender discrimination in America—from 
battles over inheritance rights, child custody laws, women working outside the home, to the 
expansion of suffrage and reproductive freedoms. Throughout her statement, Feinstein 
frequently spoke on behalf of a national constituency of women. She acknowledged that 
women are a heterogeneous group, but she also emphasized the common past and heritage 
that tie American women together. In her words,  
 
Like any population, women enjoy diverse opinions, beliefs, political affiliations, 
priorities, and values. And we share a history of having to fight for many of the 
rights and opportunities that young American women now take so much for 
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granted…By virtues of our accomplishments and our history, women have a 
perspective, I think, that has been recognized as unique and valuable. (Ibid) 
  
Interestingly, at times, male senators on the Judiciary Committee attempted to 
challenge this idea of a collective women’s identity by speaking on behalf of conservative 
women. For example, in his opening statement Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) 
commented, 
 
My good friend from California [referring to Senator Dianne Feinstein] has 
expressed a view about Roe v. Wade, which I completely understand and respect. I 
can just tell you, Judge Roberts, there are plenty of women in South Carolina who 
have an opposite view about abortion. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John 
G. Roberts: 66)    
 
Despite such challenges, Feinstein continued to speak as an authoritative voice for 
women throughout the course of the hearing. There is also evidence that her sense of 
sisterly-camaraderie extended to her female colleagues in the Senate. During Roberts’s 
hearing, Feinstein took the unusual step of submitting written questions to the nominee on 
behalf of another female senator, Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD). This procedural 
maneuver essentially allowed a non-committee member to have a say in the confirmation 
hearing process. Interestingly, Senator Mikulski primarily used this opportunity to press the 
nominee on his views about women’s rights. As the following examples demonstrate, 
Senator Milkulski raised a number of direct women’s issues, including abortion, reproductive 
rights, and gender discrimination:  
 
The Griswold decision and it progeny established the implied right of privacy in the 
Constitution. How would you use the provisions of the Constitution and its 
Amendments to the Constitution to support the right of privacy in other instances? 
 
 
What kinds of facts and circumstances would you need in order to decide that there 
was a constitutionally protected right to privacy in the reproductive rights context?  
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Your testimony regarding a past memorandum about gender discrimination is 
unclear about the level of scrutiny you would give these types of cases. At the time 
that you wrote the memo, the Supreme Court had already concluded that gender was 
a suspect classification entitled to intermediate scrutiny. Yet your memo on this issue 
implies that even intermediate scrutiny should not be given to gender discrimination 
issues even though it was the law of the land at that time. Please describe specifically 
what your memo was advocating and why. (Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
John G. Roberts: 624). 
  
The small-N of women on the Senate Judiciary Committee, coupled with the fact 
that there has never been a Republican female committee member, makes it nearly 
impossible to quantitatively examine the influence of female senators during confirmation 
hearings in any rigorous way. However, the qualitative evidence presented here suggests that 
women are actively working to represent women’s substantive group interests at this stage of 
the confirmation process. Throughout the course of Roberts’s hearing, Senator Feinstein 
openly spoke for and as a woman. In addition, she also used her intuitional power and access 
to enable another woman (Senator Barbara Mikulski) to have a say during the committee 
deliberations. In the end, both of these women used their voices to provide substantive 
representation by speaking on behalf of American women at-large.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter looked inside the Senate Judiciary Committee to see how women’s 
issues are treated during this step of the confirmation process. By focusing on one 
nomination in-depth (that of John Roberts), I was able to directly compare the comments 
made within the committee setting to those made during floor consideration of the same 
nominee. The results reveal that, for the confirmation under investigation, women’s issues 
received proportionally more attention during committee deliberations than they did on the 
floor of the Senate. Such findings were expected, given the prominence of many specific 
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women’s issues in the overarching political landscape. The eagerness of committee members 
to tackle these high-profile issues early on in the confirmation deliberations is particularly 
intriguing given the low-level of female representation on the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Apparently women’s issues received greater consideration in a setting that was largely devoid 
of women. In addition, the absence of women’s voices may have contributed to the 
somewhat more hostile tone these matters were met with during the committee stage. 
Finally, the one woman who was on the committee—Senator Dianne Feinstein—
clearly saw herself as the women’s representative on the committee. She openly spoke on 
behalf of a national women’s constituency, and she adamantly worked to advocate for 
women’s issues throughout the course of the confirmation hearings. She even used her 
power as a committee member to give another female senator an opportunity to weigh in on 
the deliberations. While future studies will have to further examine these connections across 
various political and gender-balanced settings, the limited empirics in this chapter do seem to 
suggest that the presence of women on the Senate Judiciary Committee (or relative lack 
thereof) may impact the level of women’s substantive representation during confirmation 





Of the 1,948 people who have served in the United States Senate since 1789, only 
forty-four have been women (Senators of the United States; Women in the U.S. Senate). 
While women’s voices have been essentially absent in the nation’s highest political 
institutions for much of American history, recent Congresses have seen an influx of female 
representatives. In the current 113th Congress, an all-time high of twenty women are serving 
in the U.S. Senate, nine of whom are leading committees (Steinhauer 2013). This recent 
increase in women’s descriptive representation leads to questions about potential policy 
implications. Female senators—like other female officeholders—reportedly recognize the 
historical significance of their positions and feel a sense of obligation to work on behalf of 
women’s substantive group interests. Whether it is waiting in line for one of the only two 
women’s bathroom stalls near the Senate floor, or hearing from women who live outside of 
their state, female senators on both sides of the aisle have noted the challenges and 
responsibilities that come with helping break the political glass ceiling (ibid).  
Decades of research have asked if the presence of female officeholders in pertinent 
governmental institutions matters. The majority of studies in this area conclude that female 
officeholders do make a difference, particularly when it comes to legislating in policy 
domains that directly or disproportionally impact the lives of American women. Yet, the 
breadth of this research is somewhat limited since an overwhelming majority of these studies 
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focus on the traditional policy-making process. This dissertation sought to expand this line 
of research by exploring potential connections between women’s descriptive and substantive 
representation within a broader context of national governmental institutions and America’s 
system of checks and balances. By focusing on confirmation proceedings for Supreme Court 
nominees, I was able to see if female senators use their power and access to indirectly 
advocate for women’s issues in the judicial branch.         
   
Summary of Dissertation 
The empirical chapters in this work approached this question from three separate 
angles. Chapter Three looked at gender differences in confirmation voting. Previous research 
identified several factors that influence senators’ chances of voting for a given Supreme 
Court nominee. Chief among these causes was ideological distance, with senators being 
significantly less likely to support nominees who do not share their ideological viewpoints. 
The professional qualifications and reputation of the nominee also matter, with highly-
distinguished nominees facing easier confirmation battles. In addition, the relationship 
between ideological distance and the professional qualifications of a nominee has been 
found to be multiplicative in nature, as senators are particularly intolerant of lesser-qualified 
nominees who are ideologically incompatible with their own beliefs. Other institutional and 
political factors also come into play during confirmation voting. Strong presidents (i.e., 
presidents who are not in the final year of their term and whose party controls the Senate) 
have an easier time getting their nominees through the confirmation process. Finally, 
partisan politics also matter at the individual level, as senators of the president’s party are 
more likely to vote in favor of confirmation.  
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While existing models on confirmation voting have highlighted relevant political and 
institutional factors that affect voting decisions, the literature has been criticized for ignoring 
the personal preferences of individual senators (Cameron, Cover, and Segal 1990). Chapter 
Three recognized such shortcomings and therefore proposed gender as an important 
individual-level characteristic that could influence the weighing of potential Supreme Court 
nominees. Since decades of research have found that female officeholders are more likely 
than their male counterparts to prioritize and advocate for women’s issues, I theorized that 
female senators would be particularly concerned with the ideological characteristics of a 
potential Supreme Court justice.  
To model this proposed relationship, I added an interaction term between gender 
and ideological distance. I then tested this theory in a dataset comprised of confirmation 
votes for forty Supreme Court nominations. The results revealed that female senators do 
weigh a nominee’s ideological preferences more heavily than male senators. Additional 
analyses revealed that such gender differences are not merely the result of time period 
effects. Female senators have only recently entered the Senate in noticeable numbers, and 
modern confirmations have been thought to be a more ideological time in confirmation 
voting. Many scholars and commentators have speculated that Robert Bork’s unsuccessful 
confirmation to the Court was the catalyst that ushered in this new ideological era. However, 
the results in Table 3.2 show that the gender/ideology interaction term remains significant 
even in post-Bork nominations. The final statistical model in Chapter Three further reveals 
that this focus on ideology is characteristic among female Democratic senators. While the 
female/ideology interaction term was significant and produced a substantially large 
coefficient in a model of Democratic senators, it was small and insignificant in a model of 
their Republican counterparts. 
122 
Chapter Three revealed that female senators (and particularly female Democratic 
senators) are strong ideological voters, but the results do not provide any insight into why. 
Chapter Four therefore looked at senators’ floor statements in order to gain a better 
understanding of what issues senators were concerned with and how they explained their 
voting decisions. The analyses in Chapter Four include all floor statements that dealt with a 
nominated Supreme Court justice, starting with the day the president announced the 
nomination through the final confirmation vote. The data includes statements from five 
Supreme Court nominations, those of Sonia Sotomayor, John Roberts, Stephen Breyer, 
David Souter, and Sandra Day O’Connor. These cases were selected because they offer 
leverage on a range of theoretically interesting political and institutional arrangements.  
Floor statements were then broken down into substantive and procedural comments. 
Procedural comments—those that were not about the pending nomination, but, rather, were 
about Senate business or an unrelated topic—were discarded from the analysis. The 
remaining substantive words were then analyzed to see if the remark pertained to a specific 
women’s policy issue. Women’s issues have been variously defined throughout the literature, 
so this work employed a coding rubric that included four-tiers of women’s issues: direct 
women’s issues (those that directly affect women as a constituency); traditional women’s 
issues (those that disproportionately impact women due to prevailing gender roles and 
societal norms); civil rights issues (those that raise questions about the rights and freedoms 
of politically relevant social categories); and privacy issues (those that raise questions about 
Americans’ constitutionally-protected right to privacy). As explained in Chapter Four, 
according to the extant literature, the strongest gender differences seem to emerge when 
legislators are presented with issues that directly affect women. Therefore, I expected to find 
the biggest gender effects in the direct women’s issue category.  
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All women’s issue statements were then coded in terms of policy stance. This layer 
of the content analysis provided more specific information about the views a senator was 
espousing. For each women’s issue category, statements were coded as pro if the comment 
advocated for continued or expanded legal protections. By contrast, statements were coded 
as con if the senator articulated a stance that criticized protections in these areas, or were 
otherwise opposed to the rights of the group in question. Finally, statements were coded as 
neutral if a senator touched on one of the issue categories, but did not clearly state an 
opinion on the matter.         
The final dataset included 271 floor statements and close to 550,000 substantive 
words. Initial glances at the data revealed that, for Republican nominations to the Court, 
female senators spoke at roughly the rate we would expect given their numbers in the 
Senate. However, women were noticeably quiet during Democratic confirmations. 
Descriptive statistics also revealed a similar pattern in regards to the types of statements 
senators made throughout the confirmation proceedings. In three confirmations—those of 
John Roberts, David Souter, and Sandra Day O’Connor—female senators dedicated a higher 
percent of their substantive statements to women’s issues. However, once again, the 
nominations of Sonia Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer stood out. In these nominations 
female senators addressed women’s issues at approximately the same or lower rate than their 
male counterparts. Since these were the two Democratic nominations in the dataset, I 
theorized that female senators might be more likely to speak about women’s issues when the 
nominee is viewed as potentially hostile to these matters. The initial data also suggested that 
female senators were much more likely to speak positively about women’s issues. Female 
senators frequently accounted for a disproportionate share of pro statements and a lower 
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than proportionate share of con statements, especially in the more recent nominations to the 
Court. 
In order to more rigorously test these findings, I developed a Heckman selection 
model. This model was chosen in order to account for the censored nature of the dataset—
after all, we can only analyze floor statements for senators who actually spoke on the floor of 
the Senate. The selection model included controls for factors that could affect a senator’s 
likelihood of making a floor statement—including membership on the Senate Judiciary 
committee, being a party leader, being up for reelection, gender, and freshman status. The 
outcome equation included controls for factors that could increase the amount of time a 
senator devotes to women’s issues throughout the course of his or her floor statements, 
including gender and partisanship. Table 4.3 displayed the results of this model in four 
separate datasets. The first two models looked at all coded women’s issues. The results from 
the first model revealed that party leaders and members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
were significantly more likely to speak on the floor throughout confirmation proceedings. 
Neither of the variables in the outcome equation were significant in Model 1. However, 
Model 2 looked just at positive statements that dealt with women’s issues. Here the results 
revealed that female senators and Democrats dedicated more of their floor time to 
advocating for the protection of women’s substantive group interests. Similar results were 
found in Models 3 and 4, which only looked at direct women’s issues. Once again, members 
of the Judiciary Committee and party leaders were more likely to speak on the Senate floor. 
Women and Democrats did not dedicate more of their floor time to direct women’s issues 
overall, but they did dedicate more of their floor time to making pro/direct women’s issue 
statements than their Senate colleagues. 
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The final models in Chapter Four further explored the partisan dynamics of gender 
effects. Table 4.4 displayed the results of the same four models from Table 4.3, but this time 
included an interaction term between gender and Republican nominations to the Court. The 
results revealed that female senators are particularly concerned with women’s issues when 
facing a Republican nominee. In these nominations, female senators dedicated more of their 
floor time to addressing and advocating for women’s issues (including direct women’s issues 
as well as women’s issues overall). These results suggest that female senators are more 
vigilant and active in the area of women’s rights when they feel a given nominee might be a 
potential threat to these issues. 
Chapter Five, the final empirical chapter of this work, looked inside the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. While the scarcity of women on the Committee poses a significant 
challenge to rigorously studying gender effects at this stage, Chapter Five offered some 
insight into this matter by looking at one nomination (that of Chief Justice John Roberts) at 
different steps in the confirmation process. By employing the same coding rubric as in 
Chapter Four, I was able to directly compare the deliberations that took place in committee 
to those that occurred on the Senate floor. The results revealed that women’s issues received 
proportionally more attention in the committee hearings than they did during senators’ floor 
statements. Such findings confirmed my expectations that committee members would be 
eager to tackle high-profile issues, including women’s issues, in this earlier and highly visible 
step of the confirmation process. Also as expected, the results revealed that the 
conversations about women’s issues were more negative in tone in the committee setting, 
where proportionally fewer women were able to contribute to the discussions. Finally, the 
one woman on the Committee, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) was the strongest and 
most vocal advocate for women’s issues throughout the confirmation hearings.        
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Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
Taken as a whole, the empirical findings in this dissertation offer support for those 
who argue that female officeholders make a difference. Time and time again, female senators 
differed from their male colleagues throughout the course of the confirmation proceedings. 
From actions at the committee stage down through final confirmation voting, female 
senators repeatedly stood out by acting as advocates for women’s rights and interests.  
This dissertation therefore extended the existing literature connecting the levels of 
women’s descriptive and substantive representation to an interbranch context. While 
numerous previous studies have found that female officeholders are more likely to represent 
women’s interests in the traditional policy-making process, this study replicated these 
findings in a broader framework of national political institutions and America’s system of 
checks and balances. These findings highlight how the growing gender diversity in Congress 
should not be studied in isolation. Rather, the increasing levels of gender parity in the two 
chambers can have a ripple effect throughout the entire federal government.    
Future work should continue along these lines to see if congresswomen are using 
other institutional crossroads to promote women’s interests in the judicial and executive 
branches. For example, while this dissertation showed how female senators worked to 
represent women’s substantive interests throughout the confirmation process, they might 
also be active during the earlier nomination process as well. Evidence suggests that such 
interbranch petitioning has happened at the Supreme Court level. After David Souter 
announced his retirement from the Court, Senators Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and Olympia 
Snowe (R-ME) sent a letter to President Obama urging him to nominate a woman. 
According to the female senators, “The most important thing is to nominate an 
exceptionally well-qualified, intelligent person to replace Justice Souter—and we are 
127 
convinced that person should be a woman” (Zeleny 2009). The senators went on to state 
that in order for the court to be relevant, it needed to be diverse and better reflect America 
(ibid).   
As of now, little is known about the potential influence of congresswomen in the 
other branches of government, and several exciting questions remain unanswered: Do 
female senators represent women’s interests in other high-profile nominations and 
confirmations? Do congresswomen take a more active role on women’s issues during 
oversight hearings in general? Are female members of Congress more active on budgetary 
issues relating to women’s interests?         
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation set out to explore if and how the growing gender diversity in the 
United States Senate has impacted confirmation proceedings for potential Supreme Court 
justices. The results unequivocally show it has. Female senators consistently differed from 
their male colleagues and used their positions to champion women’s issues at every step 
throughout the confirmation process. While women are still far from attaining parity in the 
Senate, the progress they have already made has left a mark. Better understanding the 
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